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
REPORT

ON

Conference on Limitation and Reduction of Armaments

GENEVA

1932-1934



OTTAWA
J. O. PATENAUDE
PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY
1934

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
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CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The Disarmament Conference, which opened at Geneva on February 2, 1932, was the culmination of preparatory work extending over more than ten years. It was also, in one sense, the climax of the post-war disarmament movement, which was born of the horror and futility of the Great War.

If armaments ever could have prevented war they should have done so in 1914, when almost every European country was armed to the teeth. Far from preventing war, however, it has been argued that they made war inevitable.

As Lord Grey has put it:—

“The moral is obvious; it is that great armaments lead inevitably to war. If there are armaments on one side there must be armaments on other sides. While one nation arms, other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by remaining defenceless. Armies must have equipment; armies cannot be of use without strategic railways. Each measure taken by one nation is noted, and leads to counter-measures by others.

“The increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each Government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of every other Government as evidence of hostile intent.

“The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable. This, it seems to me, is the truest reading of history, and the lesson that the present should be learning from the past in the interests of future peace, the warning to be handed on to those who come after us.”

The recognition of the truth of the above statement is embodied in the Treaties that brought the war to an end and in the Covenant of the League which is a part of those Treaties.

The Treaty of Versailles then, in a sense, initiated the disarmament movement. Its relation, indeed, to that movement is so important that any discussion of the background of the Conference should begin with an examination of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty and the Covenant.

(1) REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS IN THE PEACE TREATIES

Part V of the Treaty (Military, Naval and Air Clauses) imposed a measure of unilateral disarmament upon Germany and stipulated that Germany's disarmament was a prerequisite of any general limitation of armaments of the Allied, Associated and Neutral Powers.

Inasmuch as the precise connection between German disarmament and the general reduction of armaments is a matter of dispute, it will be useful to quote the relevant texts.

The preamble of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles is as follows:—

“In order to render possible initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air clauses which follow:”

It may be noted that the first source of confusion lies in a discrepancy between the English and French texts, both authentic, of this preamble. In the French version “initiation” is rendered as “preparation”—an appreciably weaker word.

In the second place, the Preamble refers to “a general limitation” of armaments while the appropriate Article of the Covenant, likewise a part of the Treaty of Peace, uses the very different word “reduction.” The difference here is more than a matter of emphasis; reduction and limitation do not shade imperceptibly into one another. One text or the other must prevail. It may be argued that the text of the Covenant supplements, and when necessary, overrides the form of words employed in the preamble to Part V. In support of this view three passages may be cited from the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, dated June 16, 1919. (British and Foreign State Papers, 1919. P. 244 et seq.) It is there stated:—

“The Allied and Associated Powers regard the Covenant of the League of Nations as the foundation of the Treaty of Peace”.... (p. 259) and again,

“The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to the German Delegates that the Covenant of the League of Nations provides for ‘the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.’ They recognize that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments; and they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction. It goes without saying that the realization of this program will depend in large part on the satisfactory carrying out by Germany of her own engagements.”

and again in reply to German representations against the unilateral disarmament imposed upon her in Part V of the Treaty:—

“The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.”

From a study of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles in the light of the official interpretation given them by the Allied Powers, certain conclusions may be drawn:—

(1) a general *reduction*, not a mere *limitation*, of armaments was contemplated by the Allied Powers in 1919. The reference to “limitation” alone in the Preamble to Part V must be read in its context in the Treaty and the Official Reply; in the context it is clear that the real objective was recognized to be reduction.

(2) the general reduction of armaments was to be “one of the *first duties* of the League of Nations,” and was to be the object of negotiations which the Allied Powers intended to open *immediately* (1919);

- (3) the disarmament of Germany was not made "solely with the object of rendering it impossible for her to resume her policy of military aggression" but as "the first step towards the general reduction of armaments." Again it was formally recognized that German disarmament would "facilitate and hasten the general reduction of armaments." That is to say an organic connection between German and general disarmament was established. The reduction of German armaments was to precede and make possible a general reduction. It was not a purely punitive measure, but a precautionary provision that would enable the other powers to follow suit with safety.

(2) DISARMAMENT IN THE COVENANT

The authority of the League of Nations to deal with the question of armaments derives from the following passages in the Covenant (Part I of the Treaties of Peace):—

(a) *Art. 1: Para. 2*, in which prospective members of the League undertake "to accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to their military, naval and air forces, and armaments."

(b) *Art. 8: 1*. "The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. "The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and the circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

3. "Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

4. "After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. "The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprises of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. "The Members of the League undertake to inter-change full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programs and the condition of such of their like industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes."

(c) *Art. 9*: "A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally."

(d) *Art. 23*: "Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the League . . .

'(d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest.'"

(3) THE PREPARATORY WORK AT GENEVA

The preparatory work began almost at once. In 1920, when the League was taking shape and initiating its activities, Europe was a prey to resentments and disturbances that were aggravated by the distress suffered in many countries.

Latent sources of conflict everywhere remained; peace was still imperfectly secured and, in fact, hostilities continued in the Near East and Russia for another two years. The Allied Supreme Council, therefore, only a few weeks after the entry into force of the Covenant, appealed to the League of Nations to examine proposals for the reduction of armaments with a view to diminishing the economic difficulties of Europe as well as alleviating the political situation.

Permanent Advisory Commission.—The first step in this path taken by the League was the constitution of the Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval, and Air questions provided for in Article 9 of the Covenant. This Commission consisted of army, navy, and air force officers of each of the countries represented on the Council. Each delegation included a naval, a military, and an air representative who were respectively members of three technical sub-commissions. When the Commission was set up, its first instructions were to examine the technical aspects of the reduction of armaments. Its functions, however, have since been restricted, by a close construction of Article 9, to the more or less routine task of advising the Council concerning the qualifications of candidates for admission to the League and the execution of certain supervisory responsibilities bequeathed to the Council by the Treaty of Versailles.

When the First Assembly addressed itself to the general question of the reduction of armaments, it was compelled to recognize the intricacy of the problem and the necessity for the League's organization of international relations before a successful solution could be found. The report which it adopted recognized that "a comprehensive scheme of disarmament based on a thorough feeling of trust and security as between nation and nation should not be looked for at once". The work must "proceed by successive stages". As an interim measure, the Assembly asked the Council to invite the Governments to undertake not to exceed their current expenditure on armaments during the two following financial years. This first proposal for an armaments truce by the method of budgetary limitation proved abortive. States were unwilling to tie their hands in the critical period of economical and political readjustment following the war. The proposal was accordingly abandoned, only to be resurrected ten years later by the 12th Assembly in 1931.

Temporary Mixed Commission.—Two other decisions of importance were taken by the First Assembly. A special section of the Secretariat to deal with disarmament questions was established and arrangements made for it to handle the interchange of information regarding armaments between States Members of the League contemplated in paragraph 6 of Article 8 of the Covenant. Furthermore, the Council recognizing that the wide ramifications of the problem, with its inherent political, economic, and other difficulties, outran the competence of the Permanent Advisory Commission which had undertaken an examination of its technical aspects, decided to appoint a new Commission composed of persons "with the requisite competence for the study of the political, economic, social, historical, and geographical aspects of disarmament". This commission was to prepare for the Council a report with proposals for the reduction of armaments under Article 8 of the Covenant.

The Temporary Mixed Commission, as it was called, was set up in February, 1921. It was composed of six recognized authorities on political and economic questions, six technical experts drawn from the Permanent Advisory Commission, four Members of the League Economic and Financial Committee, and six members of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office. Proceeding on parallel lines to the Permanent Advisory Commission, which was dealing with the technical features of the question, it continued in existence until the Assembly of 1924, and its proceedings and proposals had a decisive influence upon the League's work.

The main task of these two Commissions from 1921, apart from their work on the traffic in arms and ammunition, was to explore and describe the different elements of the problem, the principles on which armaments might be reduced, the ways of measuring reduction, and the special circumstances of States Members of the League, particularly European Members. The result of their enquiries into the various aspects of the problem of disarmament was to emphasize the close connection between mutual guarantee and the reduction of armaments which had been already recognized by the Second Assembly and was, indeed, implicit in the Covenant.

The first concrete proposal considered by the Mixed Commission was Lord Esher's scheme for applying the principle of direct quantitative limitation, worked out in Washington for naval armaments, to land and air forces. Lord Esher proposed that a common measure should be fixed for the comparison of land and air forces and that the armaments, assigned to the various powers, should be represented by a ratio. The plan was rejected by both the Permanent Advisory Commission and the Temporary Mixed Commission on the ground that its superficial simplicity was misleading, that it attempted to equate incommensurables and left out of account other factors quite as important as effectiveness in constituting the war potential of a nation.

The Temporary Mixed Commission concluded that the difficulties encountered by Lord Esher's proposals would limit the usefulness of any plans for direct reduction of armaments which were not coupled with complementary political proposals for the organization of security. It, therefore, proposed to develop the system provided by the Covenant of mutual guarantee against aggression in order to enable the Members of the League to reduce their armaments. Its discussion of this line of policy was summed up in four propositions put forward by Lord Cecil in 1922, which may be quoted here as they summarize concisely the conclusions reached by the Advisory Commission after two years' study of the problem presented to it by the Council:

"(1) No scheme for the reduction of armaments can be successful unless it is general.

"(2) In the present state of the world, the majority of Governments could not carry out a reduction of armaments unless they received satisfactory guarantees for the safety of their respective countries.

"(3) Such guarantees should be of a general character.

"(4) And, finally, there can be no question of providing such guarantees except in consideration of a definitive undertaking to reduce armaments."

These propositions, approved by the Third Assembly, were interpreted by the Temporary Mixed Commission as laying down the general lines of its activities. It undertook the preparation of a system of security based on the pledge of mutual assistance which would create a suitable political atmosphere for the realization of the reduction of armaments. As a step towards this end, the "Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance," based on regional guarantees of security was submitted to the Fourth Assembly in 1923. That Assembly was unable to adopt the proposed Treaty but referred it to the Governments for their observations. These varied. France welcomed the plan, her Continental allies concurred, but the Government of the United Kingdom attacked it as complicated and impractical. In the end the project, first fruit of three years' intensive work by the Temporary Mixed Commission, was abandoned.

The rejection of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance could not, however, be construed as a repudiation of the principles laid down by the Assembly in 1922 to guide its advisory organs in their search for a formula that would prepare the way for the reduction of armaments. Indeed, 1924, the year of the rejection of the Draft Treaty, was the year of the adoption of the Geneva

Protocol which was, in essence, a development of the principles on which the defunct draft Treaty was based. The idea of compulsory arbitration of disputes was added as a third term of the earlier objectives of disarmament and security. The "Geneva Protocol" contemplated a regime of all-in compulsory arbitration of political disputes, supplemented by the universal acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court under Article 36 of its Statute. In providing an inclusive system of peaceful settlement of disputes, it closed the notorious "gaps" in the Covenant, and in making the non-acceptance of arbitration the criterion of aggression it solved an outstanding problem in the jurisprudence of the Covenant.

The Protocol, like the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, was an instrument intended to make the reduction of armaments possible by guaranteeing the political security of disarming states. Its entry into force was conditional on the acceptance of a general disarmament convention. The two ideas of security and disarmament were regarded as inseparable. Quarrels over their logical and chronological priority had stultified earlier efforts to give effect to the undertakings of the Treaties of Peace. The Protocol attempted to end this quarrel by avoiding it, i.e., by achieving security and disarmament simultaneously.

The Protocol, however, shared the fate of the Draft Treaty, and failed to come into operation. Certain states were unable to accept it because of the new and more general commitments it involved; because they disapproved of the fresh emphasis laid on sanctions, the new occasion discovered for their employment and the elaboration of military procedure under the Covenant. These states felt that the ideas of the Protocol insensibly suggested that the vital business of the League was not so much to promote friendly co-operation and reasoned harmony in the management of international affairs as to preserve peace by organizing war.

The failure of the Protocol to gain acceptance was followed by a period of discouragement in which preparations for the far-off Conference lagged—and lost reality. The Protocol was the culmination of five years' effort along agreed lines; its rejection meant that reconsideration of the whole method of approach to the problem was required. The Temporary Mixed Commission was dissolved, the Permanent Advisory Commission returned to its routine duties of advising the Council as to the execution of Article 9. Their association in the work of preparation had not been happy, their functions overlapped, some rivalry resulted, and the consequent friction did not facilitate the progress of their joint work.

Co-ordination Committee.—A new advisory organ was established in 1924 by the Council constituting itself a preparatory Committee for the Disarmament Conference and co-opting a certain number of experts from the bodies which had been represented on the Temporary Mixed Commission. This Co-ordination Committee, as it was called, did not live long. Its mixed composition of experts and representatives of Governments proved its undoing.

Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.—Accordingly, in December, 1925, the Council reorganized the Co-ordination Committee as the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. The Preparatory Commission was composed of representatives of (1) the States Members of the Council, (2) countries which, from their special circumstances, were peculiarly interested in the problem of disarmament but which were not otherwise represented on the Commission. The Preparatory Commission, which throughout worked in close liaison with the League's technical organizations, set up two special sub-committees (A) composed of naval, military, and air experts from each country represented on the Commission, to study special military ques-

tions, (B) composed of one representative of each participating country to study non-military (principally economic) questions, raised by the Commission's activities.

Encouraged by the negotiation of the Locarno Treaties, the Preparatory Commission got under way in 1926. Its first task was the accumulation and assimilation of documentary material on armaments strength; it then proceeded to review the achievements of its predecessors and took certain general decisions on questions of policy which guided its subsequent work.

In the first place, it was agreed that the question of the reduction of armaments must be considered as a whole, i.e., land, air, and naval armaments are integral parts of the fighting strength of a nation. Reduction or limitation of one fighting arm must proceed *pari passu* with reduction or limitation of the others. Otherwise the uneasy equilibrium existing would be gravely disturbed. In the second place, the "war potential" of a nation had to be taken into account. To restrict its task by a narrow construction of its terms of reference might, superficially, simplify the problem awaiting solution but, in the opinion of the Preparatory Commission, any real reduction of armaments would have to consider such more or less imponderable factors as the degree of industrialization of a nation, its dependence on imported food and materials, its transport facilities, etc.

By 1927 the Preparatory Commission had prepared a draft disarmament Convention which represented a substantial agreement on the forms of limitation for air and military armaments but no agreement was in sight on the question of naval armaments. The 1927 Three Power Naval Conference in Geneva had failed signally and prospects of a multilateral naval agreement were remote when the three most vitally interested powers were unable to agree among themselves.

At this point, the Preparatory Commission was confronted with the Soviet proposals for immediate direct disarmament, first total disarmament, and secondly disarmament by stages in strictly arithmetical proportions of existing strength. This measure, open to the same criticisms as Lord Esher's scheme had encountered, was rejected as (1) incompatible with the provisions of Article 8 in particular and with the general organization of security in the Covenant; (2) unfair in its incidence on particular countries which had refrained from increasing their armaments in the hope that an international agreement for reduction would be reached; (3) impracticable, like all purely mathematical projects of reduction which ignore the imponderables which constitute a nation's war potential.

With the Soviet proposals out of the way, the Commission returned to its task of preparing a skeleton convention which the contemplated Conference could fill out with limitation figures for each country. By 1928 compromise and concession had resulted in a draft convention acceptable in main lines to most of the countries represented on the Commission. Germany and Soviet Russia, however, objected to the Commission's conception of its task and refused to accept its conclusions. Other powers maintained reservations on numerous points but were prepared to try to make the draft convention work. The wide acceptance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War and the belief that France and England had settled their differences over the form of naval limitation combined to strengthen the hope that the Preparatory Commission's work was done and that the General Disarmament Conference could shortly be convoked with some assurance that its objectives would be attained.

At the 10th Assembly of the League in 1929 it was quickly realized that hopes of speedy action were unfounded. The Franco-British compromise, by which France had accepted the British thesis of naval limitation in return for Great Britain abandoning her insistence on the inclusion of trained reserves in the effectives to be limited by the Convention, had been broken down by a hostile and suspicious public opinion. The new British Government therefore found it necessary to re-open questions which that compromise had attempted to close.

Meanwhile, the Preparatory Commission had suspended its sessions pending the achievement of agreement between the principal naval powers on naval limitation. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's announcement at the 10th Assembly of his intention of bringing the naval powers together in another effort to restrict competitive building gave new encouragement to States which had seen ten years elapse without apparent progress toward the goal of lower armaments. When in 1930 the Preparatory Commission resumed its work, the London Naval Treaty* made possible the preparation of schedules for naval limitation which rounded out the draft convention which the Commission transmitted to the Council of the League in December, 1930.

The next step was the setting of a date for the long postponed Conference by the Council of the League. Germany wished an immediate Conference; France advised delay. The Council compromised, and in January, 1931, fixed the opening date for February 2, 1932. Invitations to participate in a general Disarmament Conference in Geneva on that date were, therefore, sent to every state, whether a member of the League or not. No state declined the invitation.

* Report of Canadian Delegation to London Naval Conference tabled May 14, 1930.

CHAPTER 2

FIRST SESSION OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE— FEBRUARY 2 - JULY 27, 1932

The first session of the Disarmament Conference opened on February 2, 1932, under the presidency of Mr. Arthur Henderson, who had been selected by the Council of the League for that difficult and important post.

At the opening session fifty-eight countries were represented, including all the members of the League of Nations as well as the non-member states of Afghanistan, Brazil, United States of America, Turkey, and the U.S.S.R.

The Canadian delegation to the Conference was as follows:—

Head of the delegation—Right Hon. Sir George H. Perley, K.C.M.G., M.P.;

Delegates—Hon. Maurice Dupré, K.C., M.P., Miss M. Winnifred Kydd, President, National Council of Women of Canada;

Technical Advisers—Dr. W. A. Riddell, Canadian Advisory Officer, League of Nations, Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, C.M.G., D.S.O., Chief of General Staff, Department of National Defence, Mr. L. B. Pearson, First Secretary, Department of External Affairs;

Secretary to the delegation—Mr. P. E. Renaud, Secretary, Canadian Advisory Office, Geneva.

The early meetings of the Conference were devoted to organization and to the receipt of petitions from every part of the world. These represented every class and condition of people, and testified to the earnest hope of millions that something should be done for disarmament and peace. No country had more signatures, in proportion to its population, than the Dominion of Canada.

(1) GENERAL DEBATE—"SECURITY" vs. "EQUALITY"

The general debate began on Monday, February 8, and ended on Wednesday, February 24. It was opened by Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, and closed by the delegate from Panama. The representatives of forty-nine countries took part in this debate.

The speech of the head of the Canadian delegation in this debate is attached as Annex 1.

Certain general ideas could be deduced from the opening debate. The complexity of the problem had been fully recognized, but the necessity for reaching some solution had been equally recognized. It was furthermore made clear that disarmament must proceed by stages and that the work of the present Conference could only be considered as a first step. How should this first step be taken? Along what road should the Conference progress? The French advocated the way to disarmament through the reinforcement of political security. The Germans were emphatic that the first step must be the equalization of rights of all States, which means, of course, the revision of treaties which perpetuate inequality.

French post-war policy in relation to security has been consistent and persistent. Its objective has been national safety guaranteed by joint international action. Its method to this end has been clearly expressed in the French memorandum to the League of Nations, July 15, 1931:—

"The Government of the Republic are convinced of the necessity of a security guaranteed to every State by assistance which should be mutual,

effective and prompt. Nothing short of such assistance will avail to reduce those differences between the geographical situation and circumstances of the several countries which constitute the chief obstacle in the way of a simultaneous reduction of armaments. By such assistance alone can the League of Nations be given sufficient strength, material and moral, to prevent the launching of an aggression.

"France stands ready to consider all general solutions; universal pledges of mutual assistance, combination of local agreements, constitution of international armed forces, or simultaneous recourse to these several systems. She asks for herself no unilateral guarantee. In contracting defensive agreements over the past ten years, she has assumed, in a spirit of solidarity, and within the scope of Article 10 of the Covenant, wide responsibilities for the guarantee of international order. But she cannot face alone such a task. Nothing but the co-operation of each and every State in the organization of peace can bring about any real progress towards the limitation and general reduction of armaments."

But while France stressed security, Germany stressed equality, namely, that the same general rules and restrictions with respect to armaments should be imposed on all states and not merely on those disarmed by the Peace Treaties. The position of Germany in this regard is clearly and succinctly stated in the words of Herr Von Nadohny before the General Commission at the end of the First Session of the Conference, July, 1932:—

"Equality of rights is the fundamental principle upon which the League of Nations and the community of States in general is founded. If the Conference wished to establish rules and principles for the general disarmament of States, at the same time excluding Germany or other States from those general rules and principles and subjecting any State to discriminatory treatment, such an attitude would not be compatible with sentiments of national honour and international justice. It would also be contrary to Germany's contractual rights, which she could not renounce."

From the opening session up to the present, the Disarmament Conference has been confronted with this difficult but fundamental problem—the reconciliation of the French demand for security with the German demand for equality.

Sir John Simon, in his opening speech, put forward the merits of qualitative disarmament as a means of effecting this reconciliation. This implies the prohibition, or at least the limitation and regulation of certain arms, particularly offensive and aggressive in character. It was mainly along these lines that the Conference was to proceed during the next four months.

(2) DEBATE ON QUALITATIVE DISARMAMENT

On April 20 the Conference began to debate this question of qualitative disarmament. For this purpose Sir John Simon proposed a resolution which, as amended and accepted by the Conference, read:—

"Without prejudice to other proposals which fall to be discussed under later heads of the agenda, the Conference declares its approval of the principle of qualitative disarmament—i.e., the selection of certain classes or descriptions of weapons the possession or use of which should be absolutely prohibited to all states or internationalized by means of a general convention."

There remained the question as to how this qualitative disarmament could be applied. In this connection the Conference was able unanimously to agree on the following resolution:—

"In seeking to apply the principle of qualitative disarmament, as defined in the previous resolution, the Conference is of opinion that the range of

land, sea, and air armaments should be examined by the competent special committees with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defence or most threatening to civilians."

This constituted a new and important approach to the problem of disarmament. It was meant to be a supplement to, not a substitute for, quantitative disarmament. The Conference considered that at this stage quantitative disarmament could not be achieved without the prior solution of certain political difficulties. While the Great Powers were attempting to settle some of these political difficulties by informal conversations, technical committees were asked to attempt to work out the application of the principles of qualitative disarmament as agreed upon, and to discuss other technical aspects of the disarmament problem.

(3) WORK OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEES

For the above purposes the Conference set up seven technical committees. The work of these committees during the first session may be discussed briefly.

1. COMMITTEE ON EFFECTIVES

The task of this committee was to agree, if possible, on a definition of effectives so that the numerical forces returned by each state should be on a comparable basis. Agreement, however, was during the first session found to be impossible and the points of difference were referred back to the General Commission of the Conference.

2. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The committee succeeded in adopting a report, later accepted by the General Commission of the Conference, prohibiting all forms of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

3. COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

This committee accomplished considerable technical work in connection with this very difficult and complicated subject, pending the decision of the General Commission on the principle of reduction of armaments through limitation of expenditure.

4. COMMITTEE ON MORAL DISARMAMENT

This committee examined the relation of the following questions to disarmament and peace: education, broadcasting, the cinema, the theatre, the press.

5. AIR COMMITTEE

The Air Committee first attempted to apply the principles of qualitative disarmament to air weapons. It was not particularly successful. The problem to be solved was as political as it was technical, and committees of experts found a technical definition of what constituted aggressive weapons difficult to achieve. Germany, for instance, was prohibited by the Peace Treaty from having a military air force of any kind; therefore, in German eyes, all military aeroplanes were offensive and aggressive in character. France, on the other hand, could only view with alarm the abolition of military aircraft, while large civil air fleets, easily convertible into war bombers, had been developed by neighbouring states. For that reason, the French considered that the abolition of military aviation must be accompanied by some form of internationalization or regulation of civil aviation.

As a result of these divergencies of opinion the report of the Air Committee on the application of qualitative disarmament was accompanied by so many reservations and exceptions that its value was very considerably diminished.

On June 14 the Air Committee began its technical study of the very important subject of the internationalization or regularization of civil aviation.

The debate on this question was both vigorous and thorough, and opinion in regard to it was also divided. No country is more interested in this question than Canada, in great parts of which aviation is not a secondary but a primary means of transportation. The position taken by the Canadian representative on this committee was that internationalization might be desirable in a continent such as Europe where civil aviation is inevitably international in its operation and, while only a secondary means of transportation, was a primary factor in political security. But as applied to the North American continent, and especially to Canada where the international aspect enters only to a minor degree and where in wide areas aviation was a primary method of transportation with no relation to political security, internationalization was both impracticable and unnecessary.

The reasonableness of the Canadian view was later accepted by the Conference.

6. NAVAL COMMITTEE.

In its discussions of qualitative disarmament as applied to the sea, the Naval Committee encountered similar difficulties to those of the Air Committee, and it soon became clear that political and strategical considerations loomed larger in the settlement of this problem than technical. The report presented by the Committee was hardly more than a record of differences of opinion.

7. THE LAND COMMITTEE.

The discussions of the Land Committee on qualitative disarmament were as inconclusive as those of the other service committees and for similar reasons.

On June 14 the Bureau of the Conference examined the Reports of the Technical Committees. It was only too apparent that these reports did not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of qualitative disarmament. Their importance is not to be minimized, because they represented an immense amount of exploratory and co-ordinating effort; but as a basis of real and immediate achievement for the Conference they were inadequate. Therefore, if a new impetus was to come which would permit the Conference to show concrete results before adjournment, it would have to develop from another source. The Bureau, for this reason, invited the delegations of the Great Powers to resume private conversations, with a view to settling certain questions of principle raised by the reports of the Technical Committees, and more important, examining the general situation to see what could be done. Earlier private conversations had achieved little, but it was hoped that now, with elections having been held in France, and with the Conference at Lausanne approaching, a more satisfactory result might be looked for.

Several delegations, including those of the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Germany, and the United States, accordingly proceeded to an exchange of views. This exchange was interrupted by the summoning of the General Commission on June 22 to hear a statement from the head of the United States delegation embodying what were to be known as "the Hoover proposals."

(4) THE HOOVER PROPOSALS, JUNE 22ND, 1932

The new American proposals were based on the following principles: the almost universal acceptance of the Briand-Kellogg Pact; the desirability of weakening the power of the attack; the relativity of national armaments; the inter-relation of land, naval, and air arms, and the economic and political necessity for some real reduction.

Influenced by these ideas the President of the United States proposed substantially a one-third reduction of the arms of the world. In detail, the proposals involved:—

(a) *Land Forces*.—(i) Abolition of all tanks, all large mobile guns, and all chemical weapons; (ii) the strength of arms as regards effectives should be based on the preservation of internal order and defence against foreign attack. The strength required for the first was termed the “police component”; that for the second the “defence component.” The police component for each state could be estimated on the basis of that permitted Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. This would give a ratio which could be applied to all states on a basis of population with some necessary modifications for those having large Colonial possessions. Having established this police component there should be a reduction of one-third in the strength of all land arms over and above it.

(b) *Air Forces*.—All bombing planes to be abolished, coupled with the total prohibition of all bombardment from the air.

(c) *Naval Forces*.—The Treaty number and tonnage of capital ships to be reduced by one-third.

The Treaty tonnage of aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers to be reduced by one-fourth.

The Treaty tonnage of submarines to be reduced by one-third, and no nation to retain a submarine tonnage greater than thirty-five thousand tons, with a maximum of forty units and a maximum displacement per unit of twelve hundred tons.

For the purpose of reduction in destroyers, cruisers, and submarines, France and Italy should be considered as having signed the London Naval Treaty on a basis approximating the so-called accord of March 1, 1931.

(5) THE BRITISH PROPOSALS, JUNE 27TH, 1932

Five days after the submission of the United States proposals the British delegation circulated the following recommendations:—

(a) *Naval Forces*.—Reduction of the unit size of capital ships from 35,000 to 22,000 tons. Reduction of the maximum gun calibre of capital ships from 16 to 11 inches. Reduction of the unit size of cruisers from 10,000 to 7,000 tons. Reduction of the maximum gun calibre of cruisers from 8 to 6·1 inches. Reduction of the unit size of aircraft carriers from 27,000 to 22,000 tons, with a maximum gun calibre of 6·1 inches. Total abolition of submarines, or if this could not be secured, reduction of the maximum unit size to 250 tons. Reduction of the total tonnage of destroyers by one-third if submarines were abolished.

(b) *Land Forces*.—Abolition of all mobile guns above 6·1 inch calibre. Abolition of all tanks above 20 tons weight. Complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

(c) *Air Forces*.—Prohibition of bombing from the air except on precisely defined military objectives. A strict limitation on the unladen weights of all military and naval aircraft except troop carriers and flying boats. Restriction on all kinds of military and naval aircraft.

The British delegation emphasized that their proposals were to be considered as supplementary to those of President Hoover.

(6) THE CLOSING RESOLUTION

After a general though inconclusive discussion of the American proposals the General Commission adjourned until July 20, while the intervening period was utilized by a Drafting Committee to draw up a Closing Resolution for the first session. This Closing Resolution may be summarized briefly:—

1. A substantial reduction of world armaments should be effected, to be applied by a general Convention alike to land, naval and air armaments.

2. A primary objective should be to reduce the means of attack. ✓

3. *Air Forces*.—(a) Absolute prohibition of air attack against civilian populations; (b) abolition of all aerial bombardment under certain conditions of which the chief was that civil aviation should be submitted to some form of international control.

4. *Land Forces*.—(a) Quantitative limitation of certain land artillery and limitation of the maximum calibre of heavy artillery according to certain rules concerning the relation between coastal and naval artillery; (b) limitation of the maximum unit tonnage of tanks.

5. *Chemical, Bacteriological, and Incendiary Warfare*.—Complete prohibition according to the recommendations of the special committee.

6. *Supervision*.—The setting up of a Permanent Disarmament Commission with sufficient powers to ensure the effective application of the Convention.

7. The Bureau or the appropriate committees would examine the following points, which still required special study, with a view to arriving at definite conclusions as soon as the General Commission reconvened:—

(a) A strict limitation and real reduction of effectives;

(b) The limitation of national defence expenditure;

(c) The trade in and manufacture of arms and implements of war;

(d) Naval armaments;

(e) Special measures dealing with the infringements of the prohibition of the use of chemical, bacteriological, and incendiary weapons and of bombing from the air.

This Closing Resolution was adopted by the General Commission by 41 votes to 2, after a lengthy debate during which all delegations emphasized that it constituted only a beginning and must be followed by other steps which would be more decisive. Germany and the U.S.S.R. voted against it; the former because it did not embody the principle of equality, and the latter because it was considered ineffective and negative. The German Government announced at the time that it would not be represented when the General Commission resumed its work unless by that time the problem of equality had been satisfactorily solved.

The acceptance of the Closing Resolution brought to an end the first session of the Disarmament Conference. It can hardly be denied that the concrete results of the Session were disappointing; at best, they constituted only a starting point for further progress.

CHAPTER 3

SECOND SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE

(1) THE WORK OF THE BUREAU DURING THE ADJOURNMENT

From July 27, 1932, until December 18 the General Commission of the Conference remained adjourned. The Bureau, however, as the directing agency, was very active in drawing up a program of future work and in negotiating the return of Germany to the Conference.

In connection with the first, reports were requested on the following:—

- (a) the abolition of aerial bombardment (from the Air Committee);
- (b) measures for dealing with the violation of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare (from the special Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare);
- (c) measures for supervision;
- (d) the maximum calibre of heavy artillery and the maximum tonnage of tanks.

In November the Bureau received the above reports. Some were considered as suitable bases for future action but others, notably (b) and (d), were inconclusive.

The Bureau also set up during the summer special committees on effectives and on the manufacture of and trade in arms.

(2) THE RETURN OF GERMANY TO THE CONFERENCE

As to negotiations for the return of Germany to the Conference, these were conducted for the most part by the Great Powers outside the machinery of the Conference proper. The difficulty, of course, was the German demand for equality and the French reluctance to admit that demand if it would result in the rearmament of Germany or if it were unaccompanied by future guarantees of security. It was the old question of the reconciliation of German "equality" with French "security." Through the mediation of Great Britain, however, and after long negotiation, a formula was agreed upon acceptable to both France and Germany as a basis for the latter's return to the Conference. The General Commission met on December 18, and accepted this formula. Germany thereupon became once more a member of the Conference.

The declaration in question stated that one of the fundamental principles that should guide the Conference should be the grant to Germany and other Powers disarmed by the Peace Treaties of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations. At the same time the great European Powers reaffirmed that they would not in any circumstance attempt to solve present or future differences by resort to force.

With the return of Germany the Conference was in a position to continue its work. The Second Session began, therefore, on February 2, 1933, exactly one year after the opening of the First Session. The Conference had now before it new proposals from Japan, Great Britain and France.

The Japanese proposal dealt exclusively with naval armament and need only be mentioned here as there was little opportunity for discussing it during the Session.

The British proposal included concrete measures of reduction as well as certain suggestions designed to re-enforce security by regional agreements between the continental European states and a general European reaffirmation of no resort to force.

The French proposals re-emphasized the connection between disarmament and security but modified to some extent the previous French stand on this question by conceding that a general security agreement was impossible and by concentrating on treaties of mutual guarantee for European countries only. Certain measures for the reduction of naval, military and air forces were also put forward.

(3) DEBATE ON THE FRENCH AND BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The Second Session opened with a general debate on the French and British proposals which lasted for nearly a week. It was then decided to refer to the Political Commission of the Conference all questions relating to security, while at the same time the General Commission should discuss the actual disarmament measures proposed, commencing with the question of effectives and a French scheme for the standardization of the armies of continental Europe.

On February 23 the Conference, by a vote of twenty-one to five with thirty-one abstentions, decided in favour of standardization of European continental armies on a defensive short-term basis with limited effectives.

Consideration of the questions of the limitation of war material and of the Internationalization of Civil Aviation was then begun, but the important differences of opinion that had signalized discussion of these subjects in the first session, persisted.

The traditional differences of opinion also appeared in the Political Commission in the "security" debate. Great Britain was not prepared to modify her previous attitude or to adhere to any guarantee pact, even one confined to continental Europe. The British, however, were ready and anxious to supplement any continental pact of mutual assistance by a solemn affirmation accepted by all European states against the use of force. The formula for this purpose was agreed upon by the Political Commission on March 2. But the force of the agreement was somewhat lessened by the fact that 14 states abstained from voting, while the U.S.S.R. made a reservation that its application should be universal and not merely European. So far as the continental pact for mutual assistance was concerned no text could be agreed upon.

(4) THE UNITED KINGDOM DRAFT CONVENTION, MARCH 16, 1933

There was still fundamental disagreement, therefore, on many important points when Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation, presented to the Conference on March 16 a new draft Disarmament Convention. This draft, which has formed the basis of the subsequent work of the Conference, is attached as Annex 2. It comprised the following features:—

(a) A Disarmament Convention was to be concluded for a period of five years translating into articles the pledge of equality of status given to Germany.

(b) A Permanent Disarmament Commission was to be set up and a system of supervision instituted.

(c) Provision was made for calling a Conference, in the event of a breach of the Pact of Paris, to determine which party was to be held responsible.

(d) Land forces of Continental Europe were to be reduced to a militia basis by fixing eight months as the maximum period of service. A table

showed the average of daily effectives not to be exceeded in the continental armies. The figures for the principal Powers were: Germany, at home 200,000, overseas nil; France, 200,000 and 200,000 respectively; Italy, 200,000 and 50,000; Poland, 200,000 and nil; Roumania, 150,000 and nil; Czechoslovakia, 100,000 and nil; Yugoslavia, 100,000 and nil; Russia, 500,000 and nil.

(e) The disarmed countries were not to rearm in heavy war material, equality in disarmament being brought about by limitation and destruction by stages of the material in the possession of the armed countries.

(f) Bombing from the air was to be prohibited except for police purposes in certain outlying regions and the number of aircraft allowed to each of the six principal Powers (i.e., France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.) was reduced to the common denominator of 500.

(g) As regards naval reductions, the object was to extend the Treaty of London to include France and Italy, and further to stabilize the remaining naval forces of other Powers at the figures reproduced in the Armaments Year Book, 1932, i.e. to hold the situation created by the Naval Treaties until the Naval Conference due in 1935.

This draft was adopted by the General Commission as a basis for subsequent discussion on March 27 and its detailed examination was begun on April 25 in an atmosphere obviously not unaffected by recent events in Germany.

Exhaustive discussion ensued on both Part 1 (Security) and Part 2 (Disarmament) of the draft, but the conclusions reached and the recommendations made were so indecisive as often to be of little value.

On May 16 the President of the United States gave a new initiative to the Conference by addressing to the heads of the states participating therein a message in which he called upon them:

(a) To accept and act upon the British Draft Convention;

(b) To agree that in the meantime they would not increase their existing armaments over and above the limitations of the Treaties;

(c) To enter into a solemn and definite Pact of Non-Aggression stipulating that they would not send any armed force of whatever nature across their frontiers.

This message and a speech delivered shortly afterwards in Berlin by Chancellor Hitler eased the tension of the situation, and on May 19 the German delegate publicly stated that his Government accepted the British draft "not only, as hitherto, as a basis of discussion but as a basis for the future Convention itself." The United States made a further contribution to the discussion when, on May 19, its representative, Mr. Norman Davis, stated that his Government were willing to consult with other states in case of a threat to peace, with a view to averting conflict, and that, further, if the states in conference determined that a state had been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and had taken measures against the violator, then, if the United States concurred in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, they would refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort as might be taken to restore peace. The United States were also prepared, Mr. Davis continued, to assist in participating in a system of adequate supervision of arms. So far as the vexed question of the determination of the aggressor was concerned, "in the long run," Mr. Davis said, "we may come to the conclusion that the simplest and most accurate definition of an aggressor is one whose armed forces are found on alien soil in violation of treaties."

In view of this new contribution which the United States had made, the security part of the British draft was redrafted as follows:—

“Article 1. In the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, either the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations or parties to the present Convention who are not members of the League of Nations may propose immediate consultation between the Council or Assembly and any of the said parties to the present Convention.

“Article 2. It shall be the object of such consultation,

“(a) in the event of a threat of a breach of the Pact to exchange views for the purpose of preserving peace and averting a conflict;

“(b) in the event of a breach of the Pact to use good offices for restoration of peace; and

“(c) in the event that it proves impossible thus to restore peace then to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible.

Article 3. The provisions of the above Articles do not in any way prejudice rights and obligations of members of the League, nor conflict nor limit powers and duties of the Assembly and Council under the Covenant.”

An effort was also made to define an “aggressor” along lines somewhat more complicated than those suggested by Mr. Davis. Certain delegations, however, notably that of Great Britain, were unable to accept the proposed definition as being too rigid, too impracticable and as taking no account of the fact that technical acts of aggression might be at times justified by special circumstances.

The first reading of Part 2 of the Draft Convention, Measures of Disarmament, gave rise to many divergencies of view along lines which had been clearly drawn in previous discussions of the Commission.

The General Commission also considered questions of budgetary limitation and of regulation of trade in and manufacture of arms and implements of war. On the former point it was decided that the Convention should contain provisions as to the application of the principle of publicity of national defence expenditure subject to international supervision. As regards the latter, the discussion remained inconclusive. A declaration by the Canadian delegate on this subject is attached as Annex 3.

(5) THE WITHDRAWAL OF GERMANY, OCTOBER 15, 1933

On the conclusion of the first reading of the British Draft, it was accepted by the General Commission as the basis of the future Convention. It was, however, perfectly obvious from the reservations and qualifications introduced that it would be useless to proceed with a second reading. It was decided, therefore, on June 29 to adjourn the Conference until October in order to give an opportunity for conversations between the interested Governments, with a view to removing, if possible, the main obstacles in the way of agreement.

When the General Commission adjourned, therefore, it was arranged that the President of the Conference should visit the principal European capitals and discuss the most important of the questions which were preventing progress. On October 9 Mr. Henderson reported to the Bureau the results of these discussions. This report showed that while the President had accomplished useful work there were still a number of difficult and important questions remaining unsolved.

On October 14 the Bureau heard a statement from Sir John Simon (attached as Annex 4) on the result of further conversations between the principal delegations. This statement recommended certain modifications of the British Draft Convention as being necessary in view of the "present unsettled state of Europe." The German Government immediately afterwards withdrew once again from the Disarmament Conference. In announcing this withdrawal on October 15, Herr von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, stated that it was now quite clear that the Conference would not fulfil its sole object—namely, general disarmament, because of the unwillingness of the highly armed states to carry out their contractual obligations, and this rendered impossible the satisfaction of Germany's recognized claim to equality of rights.

On October 16 the General Commission met. It noted Sir John Simon's statement and approved the terms of the reply of the President of the Conference to the German note of withdrawal, wherein Mr. Henderson declared that he could not accept as valid the reasons given by the German Government for that withdrawal.

Certain delegations, in view of the new situation created by the withdrawal of Germany from the Conference, expressed a desire to consult their Governments. The General Commission, therefore, adjourned until October 26, it being understood that the Bureau would meet on the previous day.

On October 21 the German Consul at Geneva forwarded to the Secretary-General a communication intimating that Germany was withdrawing from the League of Nations, in conformity with Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.

The Bureau duly came together on 25th October. The President observed that, though existing difficulties might make it undesirable to enter upon a public discussion without a further effort being made to narrow existing differences of opinion, these difficulties did not constitute a sufficient reason for interrupting the work of the Conference.

The Bureau, on the proposal of Mr. Henderson, asked the General Commission for authority to take such steps as were necessary to enable a second reading of the draft Convention, on the basis of a text revised and brought up to date, to be started in the General Commission not later than December 4th.

The General Commission on 26th October approved the recommendations of the Bureau.

The Bureau, meeting again on 9th and 11th November, appointed three committees and six Rapporteurs to prepare the revision of the various parts of the British draft Convention. The Italian delegation declared, however, on November 10, that it considered the continuance of work by the committees as useless and inopportune, because it might hinder any agreement being reached with Germany. By a circular letter dated November 15, Mr. Henderson called under consultation at Geneva the heads of the principal delegations to advise on the procedure to be followed.

Responding to this request, the chief representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy arrived in Geneva on November 18 and, at a meeting on 21st November, together with the representative of the United States of America, agreed that the General Commission should stand adjourned until a date during or after the January session of the League Council; that parallel and supplementary conversations should be carried on through diplomatic channels to try to settle the differences that had arisen; and that, after the Committees had completed their immediate tasks, the normal machinery of the Conference should cease functioning. This suggestion was adopted by the Bureau on 22nd November.

In accordance with this wish, the Moral Disarmament Committee, the Committees of the Bureau on the question of Effectives and the revision of the General Provisions of the draft Convention, as well as the Technical Committee of the National Defence Expenditure Committee, terminated their sessions on 17th November, 6th December and 11th December respectively.

It was apparent that the Disarmament Conference had reached a deadlock, and it was obviously useless to carry on until that deadlock had been broken. The fundamental difficulty in the way was still the gap between the French and German positions, a gap which had become increasingly difficult to bridge in view of political developments during 1933, which culminated in Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations. The extent of that gap is indicated by the exchange of notes between France and Germany, attached as Annexes 5 and 6.

Both the United Kingdom and the Italian Governments have recently put forward plans designed to bridge this gap and bring Germany back into the Disarmament Conference. The Italian proposals are attached as Annex 7, while the United Kingdom proposals are attached as Annex 8.

Negotiations are at present being conducted by the United Kingdom Government with the other governments concerned on the basis of their proposals referred to above. The Bureau of the Conference has been summoned to meet on April 10, or, if it seems advisable to the President, at an earlier date, to consider the results of these negotiations and, in the light of that consideration, to draw up proposals for the future procedure of the Conference.

ANNEX 1

SPEECH OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR GEORGE H. PERLEY AT THE OPENING DEBATE, FEBRUARY 13, 1932

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Dominion of Canada, which has a deep and abiding interest in the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments as a method of ensuring world peace, is united in urging with all the power at her command, that something practical and concrete should be done toward this end at the present Conference. Her delegation will be proud to carry out its instructions to give any assistance within its power in the achievement of this much-to-be-desired result.

Canada is conscious of the fact that the solution of the problems before the Conference is of direct and vital importance to her, as indeed it must be to every State, no matter what its position may be. There is no country which can escape the result of what this Conference may do, or refuse to do at this time. On every country represented here, there is a solemn obligation to do what lies within its power to make that result one of benefit to humanity. Nowhere is this obligation taken more seriously, either by the Government or by the people, than in the country which I and my colleagues have the honour to represent. In no country is the interest in this Conference, or anxiety for its success, greater than in the Dominion of Canada. The presence here in our delegation of two Ministers of the Crown and the President of our National Council of Women is an indication of the importance that our Government attaches to it.

The Canadian petitions that have been laid before you are a witness to the intense interest of our people in your deliberations. Those petitions are no meaningless lists of names, but the living expression of the public opinion of our Dominion on this question of disarmament. A half million of our citizens, no small proportion of our population, representing every class and every section have made this declaration for peace through reduction of arms. In the dark days of 1914-1918, the Canadian people put all their energy into war; they are happy now to be able to devote that energy to peace. We take this Disarmament Conference very seriously, because its success will provide an alternative to war and we have been forced to take war seriously.

His Majesty's Government in Canada is convinced that the time has now come for a general limitation and reduction of armaments, and we believe that for this purpose the draft Convention now before the Conference, though it includes details which require further examination, provides a suitable basis for discussion and consideration.

We appreciate, of course, the relation between armaments and national security, but our experience has taught us that reduction of armaments can itself be a source of security. The two are, indeed, interrelated and interdependent. Certainly, every page of history proves that no permanent security can be found in armaments alone, for every effort made to achieve that form of security means insecurity for some one else. Your security becomes your neighbour's insecurity, and he, inspired by considerations of fear and self-defence, builds up his own armaments. The vicious circle has begun, to which there is no end until the sword cuts through.

Our own country is, we have the right to say, relatively without armaments. We are more than ten millions of people, and the fifth trading nation in the world, but our armaments, as the figures which we have published show, are

calculated only for the preservation of internal order and for the performance of the obligations imposed on us by international law. In no conceivable sense could they be considered as a menace to any State. Nevertheless, we feel secure.

We admit that this security is in some measure the result of a happy combination of geographical, historical, and political circumstances. On the east and west, we face the ocean; on the north, the arctic seas. On the south, we have as our neighbour a great and friendly nation, with whom we have developed machinery for arbitration and conciliation, the successful functioning of which is causing the peaceful settlement of disputes between us (and we have many of them) to become a habit rather than an event. Our experience in this regard has brought us the conviction that the best insurance against war is the friendship and good will of your neighbours. We do not deny that in respect to our situation, then, we are one of the most favoured of countries. Yet we make bold to declare that armies on our frontiers or warships on our inland seas might prejudice the beneficent effect of that fortunate situation.

In respect to the organization of peace, the importance of which we appreciate, we recognize the value of the many agreements that have been made during the last twelve years, and we are convinced that those agreements should already have resulted in a marked reduction of armaments rather than in the disturbing increases which, in many cases, the published figures show. We think further that this organization of peace can best be achieved at this time by emphasizing the prevention of conflict, rather than the punishment of aggression; by building up machinery for conciliation, rather than providing for sanctions; by using the League of Nations as a channel through which international public opinion can express itself, rather than by developing it into a super-State. In adopting this view, which we genuinely consider to be a constructive one, we are convinced that we are serving not merely our own interests, but the true interests of all nations as well.

It has at times been suggested that our own fortunate situation and our isolation in the New World have made us indifferent to the problems of the Old. We frankly admit our reluctance to become involved in political problems, over which we have no control and whose solution we cannot affect, but we are not indifferent to those problems. Bitter experience has taught us that under present conditions we live in a world of inter-dependent States, and fifty thousand Canadians who will forever sleep in European soil are silent witnesses to this fact.

May I repeat, in conclusion, that His Majesty's Government in Canada will whole-heartedly support any and every constructive proposal for the limitation and reduction of armaments which may be laid before this Conference. We believe that action towards this end should be taken, and taken now. Further delay would be fatal.

The generation that remembers so well the horror, the futility, the brutality of war is passing away. This, ladies and gentlemen, may be the last great opportunity given us to act, before responsibility passes to those for whom the sound of the trumpet may seem to be a call to adventure rather than a summons to death.

If we seize this opportunity, we may possibly exaggerate our success. But, if we let it pass, we will never be able to exaggerate the tragedy of our failure.

ANNEX II

**DRAFT CONVENTION
SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION**

March 16, 1933

Part I**SECURITY***Article 1*

The following articles (2 to 5) are concluded between those of the Parties to the present Convention who are Parties to the Pact of Paris.

Article 2

It is hereby declared that any war undertaken in breach of that Pact is a matter of interest to all the High Contracting Parties and shall be regarded as a breach of the obligations assumed towards each one of them.

Article 3

In the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, a conference between the High Contracting Parties shall at once meet at the request of any five of them, provided that at least one of the Governments mentioned by name in Article 4 joins in that request. Such request may be addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, whose duty it will then be to make arrangements for the Conference and to notify the High Contracting Parties accordingly. The meeting shall take place at Geneva, unless any other meeting-place is agreed upon.

Article 4

Any conclusions reached at such meeting shall, to be valid, require the concurrence of the representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and of a majority of the representatives of the other Governments participating in the Conference, exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute.

Article 5

It shall be the object of the said Conference, if called in view of a threat of breach of the Pact, to agree upon the steps which could be taken in respect of such threat and, in the event of a breach of the Pact of Paris being found to have occurred, to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible.

Article 6

Special regional agreements made by certain of the High Contracting Parties for providing information intended to facilitate the decisions to be given under Article 5 and for co-ordinating action to be taken by these Parties as a result of such decisions are contained in Annexes X and Y.

Part II

DISARMAMENT

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit their respective armaments as provided in the present Convention.

SECTION I.—EFFECTIVES

CHAPTER I.—PROVISIONS AS TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION

Article 8

The average daily effectives in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the tables annexed to this chapter.

Article 9

It is understood that effectives consist of:

- (a) All officers, officer cadets, N.C.O's, soldiers, sailors, airmen, reservists and all other persons (such as military officials of the administrative, sanitary or veterinary services or military agents) of equivalent status who perform a day's duty in the land, sea and air armed forces;
- (b) Persons who perform a day's duty in police forces or similar formations under the conditions prescribed in Article 12;
- (c) All other persons of at least 18 years of age who receive military training under the control of the State.

Article 10

The High Contracting Parties undertake to prohibit any military training whatsoever except in organizations under the control of their respective Governments.

Article 11

The average daily effectives are reckoned by dividing the total number of days' duty performed by actual effectives in each year by the number of days in such year.

In the case of continuous service, every day shall count as a day's duty. A deduction of 5 per cent may in each case be made from the total average daily effectives on account of persons sick in hospital, persons on leave for two or more days and persons prematurely discharged on leave. Any Party for which the above-mentioned absences represent a greater percentage may make a correspondingly larger deduction after furnishing to the Permanent Disarmament Commission details as to its basis of computation.

In the case of intermittent service or instruction, attendances aggregating six hours may count as the equivalent of one day's duty.

Article 12

A police force or similar formation may be disregarded for the purpose of calculating effectives, unless it has at least one of the following characteristics:

- (a) Arms other than individual (machine pistols, Lewis guns, machine guns and weapons of accompaniment, etc.);
- (b) Training of a military nature other than close order drill, physical training or technical training in the use of individual arms;

- (c) Transport, signalling or engineer equipment of a suitable nature and on a sufficient scale to enable it to be employed by units in tactical operations.

The possession by a force of one or more of the above characteristics will, in principle, determine its inclusion in whole or in part in the calculation of effectives of the land armed forces. Doubtful cases should be referred to the Permanent Disarmament Commission, who will give a decision by reviewing the military capacity of the force in the light of all the above characteristics and taking into account, in particular, the following confirmatory conditions:

- (i) Quartering in barracks;
- (ii) Training in groups of one hundred men or more;
- (iii) Organization on a military basis;
- (iv) Previous military training.

Article 13

The following naval effectives should be included among the effectives of the land armed forces:

- (a) Effectives employed in land coast defence;
- (b) Marines who are normally in excess of those assigned to or destined for service afloat;
- (c) Effectives coming within the classification of similar formations (as defined in Article 12).

Naval personnel serving ashore in the fleet services (training, administrative, etc.), as well as those assigned to or destined for service afloat, will be included in the effectives of the sea armed forces.

TABLE I

TABLE OF AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE LAND ARMED FORCES.

(Note.—This table contains only the figures which are suggested for the countries of continental Europe. It would, of course, require to be completed by the addition of figures in respect of all the other Parties.)

Party	Land armed forces	
	Stationed in home country.	Total including overseas.
Germany.. . . .	200,000	200,000
Belgium	60,000	75,000
Bulgaria.. . . .	60,000	60,000
Spain.. . . .	120,000	170,000
France	200,000	400,000
Greece	60,000	60,000
Hungary	60,000	60,000
Italy	200,000	250,000
Netherlands	25,000	75,000
Poland	200,000	200,000
Portugal	50,000	60,000
Roumania	150,000	150,000
Czechoslovakia	100,000	100,000
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	500,000	500,000
Yugoslavia	100,000	100,000
Each other continental European State.. . . .	(no separate figure)	50,000

TABLE II

TABLE OF AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE SEA ARMED FORCES.

(The figures will have to be related to the naval material allowed to each Party.)

TABLE III

TABLE OF AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE AIR ARMED FORCES.

(The figures will have to be related to the air material allowed to each Party.)

CHAPTER 2.—SPECIAL PROVISIONS AS TO THE ORGANISATION OF THE LAND ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.

Article 14

The provisions of this chapter apply only to the land armed forces stationed in continental Europe.

Article 15

Troops whose primary function is to provide drafts or reinforcements for overseas garrisons are excluded from the provisions of this chapter.

Article 16

The maximum total period of service for the effectives in the land armed forces stationed in continental Europe (excluding the troops mentioned in Article 15 above and the personnel referred to in Article 18) shall not exceed eight months.¹

Article 17

For each man the total period of service is the total number of days comprised in the different periods of service to which he is liable under national law or by the terms of his contract to perform.

Article 18

In the land armed forces affected by this chapter the personnel whose length of service is greater than that prescribed in Article 16 shall not at any time exceed the following proportions of the average strength throughout the year of the said forces.

Officers, officer cadets and persons of equivalent status..	$\frac{1}{x}$
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N.C.O's, soldiers and persons of equivalent status.. . . .	$\frac{1}{y}$
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CHAPTER 3.—PROVISIONS AS TO THE METHODS BY WHICH THE REDUCTIONS AND RE-ORGANISATIONS ENTAILED BY THE PRECEDING CHAPTERS SHALL BE EFFECTED.

(*Note*.—A series of articles will be required to deal with this matter.)

SECTION II—MATERIAL

CHAPTER I—LAND ARMAMENTS

Article 19

The maximum limit for the calibre of mobile land guns for the future shall be 105 mm. Existing mobile land guns up to 155 mm. may be retained, but all replacement or new construction of guns shall be within the maximum limit of 105 mm.

For the purpose of this section, a gun of 4.5 inches calibre shall be regarded as equivalent to one of 105 mm. in the case of countries whose standard gun is of the former calibre.

The maximum limit for the calibre of coast defence guns shall be 406 mm.

¹ In special cases to be decided by the Conference, the maximum total period of service may be extended to twelve months.

Article 20

For the purposes of the present Convention, a tank is defined as follows:

"A tank is a fully armoured, armed, self-propelled vehicle designed to cross broken ground, usually by means of tracks, and to overcome obstacles encountered on the battlefield."

Article 21

The maximum limit for the weight of tanks shall be 16 tons.

(*Note.*—It will be observed that one important aspect of land war material is not here fully dealt with. No proposals are here submitted for tanks under the 16-ton weight limit. In its proposals of November 17 last, the United Kingdom Government drew attention to the different characteristics of the heavy and the light tank. The problem created by the latter evidently requires further international examination, and the question is therefore left open for negotiation in order that agreement may be reached upon the future of this important modern weapon.)

Article 22

All mobile land guns above 155 mm. and all tanks above 16 tons shall be destroyed in the following stages:

One-third within twelve months of the coming into force of the Convention;

Two-thirds within three years of the coming into force of the Convention.

All guns above 105 mm. shall be destroyed so soon as they are replaced by new guns of or below 105 mm.

CHAPTER 2.—NAVAL ARMAMENTS

SUB-CHAPTER I

Article 23

The naval armaments of the Parties to the Treaty of Washington, signed on February 6, 1922, and the Treaty of London, signed on April 22, 1930, remain subject to the limitations resulting from the said Treaties.

Article 24

Articles 25 and 26 constitute the agreement between the Parties to the Treaty of London referred to in Article 24, paragraph 4, of that Treaty. France and Italy will ratify the said Treaty not later than the date of their ratification of the present Convention.

Article 25

Until December 31, 1936, the naval combatant vessels of France and Italy, other than capital ships, aircraft-carriers and all vessels exempt from limitation under Article 8 of the Treaty of London, shall be limited, without prejudice to Article 12 of the said Treaty, by the provisions of Articles 26 and 27 of the present Convention. The definitions adopted in Annex I for the purposes of the present chapter will apply.

Article 26

(a) The completed tonnage in the cruiser, destroyer and submarine categories which is not to be exceeded by France and Italy on December 31, 1936, is to be the completed tonnage arrived at in consequence of the provisions of Article 27.

(b) France and Italy shall have complete freedom of transfer for the purposes of replacement between cruisers of sub-category (ii) and destroyers.

Article 27

Until December 31, 1936, the programs of France and Italy in cruisers, destroyers and submarines will be as follows:

A. Cruisers with guns of more than 6.1" (155 mm.) calibre.

No further tonnage shall be laid down or acquired after the date of signing the present Convention.

B. Cruisers with guns of 6.1" (155 mm.) calibre or less, and destroyers.

The amount of further construction to be laid down or acquired by France during the period between January 1, 1933, and December 31, 1936, shall be limited to 34,298 (34,847 metric) standard tons as authorized in the French program of 1932.

The amount of further construction to be laid down or acquired by Italy during the same period shall be limited to 27,173 (27,608 metric) standard tons.

Tonnage laid down or acquired in accordance with the French program of 1931 and the Italian program of 1931-32, and any tonnage laid down or acquired subsequently shall be devoted to the replacement of over-age cruisers of this sub-category or of over-age destroyers. Upon the completion of any replacement tonnage, a corresponding amount of over-age tonnage shall be disposed of in accordance with Annex VI to the present chapter.

C. Submarines.

Until December 31, 1936, France and Italy will not lay down or acquire any further submarines. France will arrange her present submarine building and scrapping program so that, on the said date, her completed tonnage will not be greater than . . . standard tons.

Any submarine tonnage under construction on that date shall be in anticipation of replacement requirements.

SUB-CHAPTER II

Article 28

No High Contracting Party shall lay down or acquire any capital ship during the period up to December 31, 1936, except that Italy may lay down one ship not exceeding 26,500 (26,924 metric) standard tons and carrying guns not exceeding 13" (330 mm.) calibre.

Except as provided in Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of London, no High Contracting Party shall, until December 31, 1936, lay down or acquire any submarine the standard displacement of which exceeds 2,000 (2,032 metric) standard tons or carrying a gun above 5.1" (130 mm.) calibre.

SUB-CHAPTER III

Article 29

In order to bring about a stabilization of naval armaments until December 31, 1936, the armaments of those High Contracting Parties to whom the Treaties of Washington and London do not apply shall, until the said date, be limited as follows:

(a) No cruisers carrying guns of a calibre above 6.1" (155 mm.) shall be constructed or acquired.

(b) On December 31, 1936, the completed tonnage in cruisers of sub-category (ii), destroyers and submarines possessed by each of the said High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the amounts specified for such Party in Annex IV. This

provision does not, however, apply to vessels exempt from limitation under Annex II to this chapter, nor to the special vessels shown in Annex III. These special vessels may not be replaced.

(c) Ships in the categories subject to limitation may only be laid down or acquired in accordance with the replacement rules contained in Annex V, and only in replacement of tonnage in the same category or sub-category which is or becomes over age in accordance with those rules.

Nevertheless there shall be complete freedom of transfer for purposes of replacement between the cruisers of sub-category (ii) and destroyers.

Vessels which have to be disposed of as being surplus to the tonnage figures set out in Annex IV shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules set out in Annex VI.

(d) Existing ships of various types which prior to April 1, 1933, have been used as stationary training establishments or hulks may be retained in a non-seagoing condition.

[Annexes not printed.]

Article 30

The High Contracting Parties assent to the rules laid down in Part IV of the Treaty of London and accept them as established rules of international law.

The present article constitutes, as regards those High Contracting Parties to whom the Treaty of London does not apply, the accession contemplated by Article 25 of the said Treaty.

SUB-CHAPTER IV

Article 31

It is understood that none of the provisions of the present chapter shall prejudice the attitude of any of the High Contracting Parties at the conferences referred to in Article 32. The present Convention establishes no permanent ratio in any category of ship and creates no precedent as to whether, and if so in what manner, tonnage remaining over age on December 31, 1936, for which replacement tonnage has not been laid down, may ultimately be replaced.

Article 32

Concurrently with the Conference in 1935 provided for under Article 23 of the Treaty of London, or at least in the same year, there shall be a conference of all the High Contracting Parties possessing naval armaments with a view to the establishment of limitations to be observed after December 31, 1936.

Article 33

The Permanent Disarmament Commission set up under Article 64 of the present Convention will take immediate steps to prepare for the conferences of 1935 referred to in Article 32, by ascertaining the opinions of the High Contracting Parties concerned. It will also examine, with a view to reporting to the said conferences, technical questions of qualitative reduction in the sizes of vessels of war in the various categories, as well as any other questions relating to the limitation of naval armaments which the Commission may consider could appropriately come before the said conferences.

I. Definitions—Annex III of the Draft Convention, as amended by the Naval Commission.

II. Exempt Vessels—Annex I of the Draft Convention, as amended by the Naval Commission.

III. List of Special Vessels.

- IV. Tonnage Figures for Powers other than those Signatories of the Treaty of Washington. These figures will be the figures from the returns to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations reproduced in the *Armaments Year Book*, 1932, "exempt" and "special" vessels being omitted.
- V. Replacement Rules—Annex IV of the Draft Convention, as amended by the Naval Commission.
- VI. Rules for Disposal—Annex V of the Draft Convention, as amended by the Naval Commission.

CHAPTER 3—AIR ARMAMENTS

Article 34

The High Contracting Parties accept the complete abolition of bombing from the air (except for police purposes in certain outlying regions).

Article 35

The Permanent Disarmament Commission set up under Article 64 of the present Convention shall immediately devote itself to the working out of the best possible schemes providing for:

- (a) The complete abolition of military and naval aircraft, which must be dependent on the effective supervision of civil aviation to prevent its misuse for military purposes;
- (b) Alternatively, should it prove impossible to ensure such effective supervision, the determination of the minimum number of machines required by each High Contracting Party consistent with his national safety and obligations, and having regard to the particular circumstances of each country.

The schemes prepared by the Permanent Disarmament Commission shall be reported to the second Disarmament Conference. In any case, the measures relating to civil aviation set out in Annex II will apply during the period of the present Convention.

Article 36

With a view to effecting the reductions necessary to facilitate the attainment of the objects referred to in Article 35, the number of aeroplanes, capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties who at present possess such aeroplanes shall, by the end of the period of the present Convention, not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the table annexed to this chapter; as regards the other High Contracting Parties, the *status quo* existing on January 1, 1933, shall be maintained during the said period.

Each of the High Contracting Parties mentioned in the table annexed to this chapter may keep a number of aeroplanes in immediate reserve, not exceeding in each case 25 per cent of the number of aeroplanes in commission in the land, sea and air forces of such Party.

Article 37

The High Contracting Parties agree that their air armaments will not include aeroplanes exceeding 3 tons unladen weight. Exception, however, may be made in the case of troop-carriers and flying-boats. Complete particulars of any such machines exceeding the maximum unladen weight of 3 tons must be returned annually to the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Article 38

No dirigible shall be constructed or acquired during the period of the present Convention by any of the High Contracting Parties for commission in their land, sea or air forces. The High Contracting Parties who at present possess such dirigibles may, however, retain but not replace them during the said period.

Article 39

The definition of unladen weight is given in Annex I.

Article 40

Aeroplanes, capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air armed forces of any of the High Contracting Parties in excess of the number indicated for such Party in the table annexed to this chapter must have been put out of commission or otherwise disposed of by the end of the period of the present Convention. At least one-half of such excess must, in the case of each such High Contracting Party, have been so dealt with by June 30, 1936.

Article 41

Aeroplanes exceeding the maximum unladen weight indicated in Article 37 and now existing in the armed forces of the High Contracting Parties must all, except in so far as exceptions may be made in accordance with that article, have been destroyed by the end of the period of this Convention. At least half of their number must, in the case of each High Contracting Party, have been destroyed by June 30, 1936.

TABLE—AEROPLANES

(*Note.*—Figures will have to be inserted subsequently for the other Parties which at present possess military or naval aeroplanes).)

Belgium.. . . .	150	Norway.. . . .	75
United Kingdom.. . . .	500	Poland.. . . .	200
China.. . . .	100	Portugal.. . . .	25
Czechoslovakia.. . . .	200	Roumania.. . . .	150
Denmark.. . . .	50	Siam.. . . .	75
Estonia.. . . .	50	Spain.. . . .	200
Finland.. . . .	25	Sweden.. . . .	75
France.. . . .	500	Switzerland.. . . .	75
Greece.. . . .	75	Turkey.. . . .	100
Italy.. . . .	500	Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-	
Japan.. . . .	500	lics.. . . .	500
Latvia.. . . .	50	United States of America.. . .	500
Lithuania.. . . .	50	Yugoslavia.. . . .	200
Netherlands.. . . .	150		

ANNEX I

DEFINITION OF UNLADEN WEIGHT

The unladen weight of an aeroplane is the weight of the aeroplane complete with all the elements necessary for flying but without crew, fuel, oil, cooling liquids or military equipment.

The unladen weight of an aeroplane comprises exclusively the weights of the following parts:

Complete aeroplane without engine (wings, movable or fixed, without safety slots, fuselage or hull, undercarriage or floats);

Power plant or plants complete; empty motor or motors,¹ propeller or propellers, with all the necessary accessories² required for their immediate operation and control; Empty tanks, with release or drainage appliances (if any), but excluding supplementary tanks; Permanent fixtures required for mounting instruments and equipment of all kinds.

ANNEX II

Being convinced of the importance of taking measures designed to prevent the use of civil aviation for military purposes in the event of war, without at the same time hampering its legitimate development and usefulness to mankind in time of peace:

Recognizing that, to be effective, such measures must be framed on a worldwide basis and, therefore, to be generally acceptable, must entail the minimum interference with the existing national and international organizations:

The High Contracting Parties agree as follows:

I. Civil Aircraft.

- (a) (i) Not to permit the construction of civil aircraft with a view to their eventual use for war purposes;
 - (ii) Not to permit in the design of civil aircraft, constructional features intended to facilitate the installation of military fixtures or fittings.
 - (b) Not to licence, or to permit to fly, any civil aircraft which infringes the prohibition contained in (a) above.
 - (c) To furnish the following information within *x* months of the end of each year to the League:
 - (i) The total number of its national civil aircraft;
 - (ii) The following particulars as regards individual civil aircraft:
 - (a) Unladen weight;
 - (b) Authorized laden weight.
 - (d) In the case of any civil aircraft having an unladen weight of over *x* tons:
 - (i) To inform the League forthwith of the issue of the licence to fly;
 - (ii) To render to the League a certificate that the aircraft does not infringe the provisions of paragraph (a) above;
 - (iii) To acquaint the League with the purposes for which the aircraft will be used, the route upon which the aircraft will normally be employed, the location of its usual station, its unladen weight and its authorized maximum laden weight.
 - (e) To allow duly qualified representatives of the League of Nations to have free access at all reasonable times to all civil aircraft, for the purpose of ascertaining that such aircraft do not in fact infringe the prohibitions contained in paragraph (a) above.
 - (f) In the event of the League representative, as a result of the inspection provided for in (e) above, being of opinion that a civil aircraft infringes the prohibitions contained in paragraph (a) above (either as a result of subsequent modification or any other cause) the League shall represent the matter to the Government concerned who undertake forthwith to suspend or cancel the licence of such aircraft pending further investigation.
- (Note.—The effect of these proposals would be to establish, under the direction of the League, a complete international register of all civil aircraft—comparable to the registers of shipping at present maintained by Lloyd's and similar organizations.)

II. Civil Aviation Personnel.

The High Contracting Parties will not require civil aviation enterprises to employ

¹ The empty motor comprises the motor proper with all the accessories necessary for its immediate operation, which form an integral part of it—that is to say:

Carburettor, with controls, feed-pipes, ignition and connections, cooling liquid and oil pumps with piping on the motor, charging or supercharging gear forming part of the motor, various attachments for revolution counters and auxiliaries forming part of the motor, reduction gear and propeller hub.

² Accessories to power plant:

- (a) Motor controls complete;
- (b) Fixed self-starters and accessories, starting magneto, claws and handles, and tanks;
- (c) Fuel supply system: pumps not forming part of the motor, piping accessories, intermediate tanks, and various indicators;
- (d) Lubrication system: pipes not forming part of the motor, radiators, shutters and controls;
- (e) Cooling system: piping not forming part of the motor, radiators, shutters and controls, ventilators and ventilator shutters in the case of air-cooled motors, and their controls;
- (f) Transmissions of propellers;
- (g) Accessories: various instruments, revolution-counters, and fixed extinguishers.

personnel specially trained for military purposes, and will not prescribe the training of civil aviation personnel in military duties.

III. *Air Lines.*

The High Contracting Parties will not establish civil air lines principally or specifically intended for use for military purposes.

IV. *National Subsidies.*

(a) The High Contracting Parties will not subsidize, directly or indirectly, air lines other than those established or to be established for economic, administrative and social purposes.

(b) The amounts and conditions of all national subsidies shall be communicated to, and published by, the League of Nations.

Part III

EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Articles 42 to 46

[The provisions of this part will depend in the main on the limitations and restrictions imposed by the other parts of the Convention. It does not seem necessary therefore to attempt to draft them now. It is only necessary to note that Articles 34 and 35 of the draft Convention will have to be reproduced.]

Part IV

CHEMICAL WARFARE

SECTION I.—PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL, INCENDIARY OR BACTERIAL WARFARE

Article 47

The following provision is accepted as an established rule of International Law:

The use of chemical, incendiary or bacterial weapons as against any State, whether or not a Party to the present Convention, and in any war, whatever its character, is prohibited.

This provision does not, however, deprive any Party which has been the victim of the illegal use of chemical or incendiary weapons of the right to retaliate, subject to such conditions as may hereafter be agreed.

With a view to the application of this rule to each of these categories of weapons, the High Contracting Parties agree upon the following provisions:

Article 48

The prohibition of the use of chemical weapons shall apply to the use, by any method whatsoever, for the purpose of injuring an adversary, of any natural or synthetic substance harmful to the human or animal organism, whether solid, liquid or gaseous, such as toxic, asphyxiating, lachrymatory, irritant or vesicant substances.

This prohibition shall not apply

- (a) To explosives;
- (b) To the noxious substances arising from the combustion or detonation of explosives provided that such explosives have not been designed or used with the object of producing noxious substances;
- (c) To smoke or fog used to screen objectives or for other military purpose, provided that such smoke or fog is not liable to produce harmful effects under normal conditions of use.

Article 49

The prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons shall apply to:

(1) The use of projectiles specifically intended to cause fires.

The prohibition shall not apply to:

(a) Projectiles specially constructed to give light or to be luminous and generally to pyrotechnics not intended to cause fires, or to projectiles of all kinds capable of producing incendiary effects accidentally;

(b) Incendiary projectiles designed specifically for defence against aircraft, provided that they are used exclusively for that purpose.

(2) The use of appliances designed to attack persons by fire, such as flame-projectors.

Article 50

The prohibition of the use of bacterial arms shall apply to the use for the purpose of injuring an adversary of all methods for the dissemination of pathogenic microbes, or of filter-passing viruses, or of infected substances, whether for the purpose of bringing them into immediate contact with human beings, animals or plants, or for the purpose of affecting any of the latter in any manner—for example, by polluting the atmosphere, water, foodstuffs or any other objects.

SECTION II.—PROHIBITION OF PREPARATIONS FOR CHEMICAL, INCENDIARY AND BACTERIAL WARFARE

Article 51

All preparations for chemical, incendiary or bacterial warfare shall be prohibited in time of peace as in time of war.

Article 52

In order to enforce the aforesaid general prohibition it shall in particular be prohibited:

(1) To manufacture, import, export or be in possession of appliances or substances exclusively suited to chemical or incendiary warfare.

The quantities of chemical substances necessary for protective experiments, therapeutic research and laboratory work shall be excepted. The High Contracting Parties shall inform the Permanent Disarmament Commission of the quantities of the said substances necessary for their protective experiments.

The manufacture of and trade in these substances may not be undertaken without Government authorization.

(2) To manufacture, import, export or be in possession of appliances or substances suitable for both peaceful and military purposes with intent to use them in violation of the prohibition contained in Article 48.

(3) To instruct or train armed forces in the use of chemical, incendiary or bacterial weapons and means of warfare, or to permit any instruction or training for such purposes within their jurisdiction.

Article 53

The provisions of Articles 51 and 52 shall not restrict the freedom of the High Contracting Parties in regard to material and installations intended exclusively to ensure individual or collective protection against the effects of chemical, incendiary or bacterial weapons, or to training with a view to individual or collective protection against the effects of the said weapons.

Article 54

The High Contracting Parties shall inform the Permanent Disarmament Commission of the lacrymatory substances intended to be used by their authorities for police operations as well as of the number of the various appliances by means of which they are to be utilized.

SECTION III.—SUPERVISION OF THE OBSERVANCE OF THE PROHIBITION OF PREPARATIONS FOR CHEMICAL, INCENDIARY OR BACTERIAL WARFARE

Article 55

The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall examine the complaints put forward by any Party which may allege that the prohibition to prepare for chemical, incendiary or bacterial warfare has been violated.

SECTION IV.—ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACT OF THE USE OF CHEMICAL, INCENDIARY OR BACTERIAL WEAPONS

Article 56

Any Party claiming that chemical, incendiary or bacterial weapons have been used against it shall notify the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

It shall, at the same time, notify the authority designated for the purpose by the Permanent Disarmament Commission or, failing such authority, the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to it, with a view to the immediate constitution of a commission of investigation.

If the above-mentioned authority has received the necessary powers, it shall itself act as a Commission of Investigation.

Article 57

The Commission of Investigation shall proceed with all possible speed to the inquiries necessary to determine whether chemical, incendiary or bacterial weapons have been used.

It shall report to the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Article 58

The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall invite the Party against which the complaint has been made to furnish explanations.

It may send commissioners to the territory under the control of that Party for the purpose of proceeding to an inquiry, to determine whether chemical, incendiary or bacterial arms have been used.

Article 59

The Permanent Commission may also carry out any other inquiry with the same object.

Article 60

The Parties involved in the above-mentioned operations, and, in general, all the Parties to the present Convention, shall take the necessary measures to facilitate these operations, particularly as regards the rapid transport of persons and correspondence.

Article 61

According to the result of the above-mentioned operations, the Permanent Commission, acting with all possible speed, shall establish whether chemical, incendiary or bacterial weapons have been used.

Article 62

The details of the application of the provisions of this chapter shall be fixed by regulations to be issued by the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Part V**MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS****SECTION I.—PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION****CHAPTER I.—COMPOSITION***Article 63*

There shall be set up at the seat of the League of Nations a Permanent Disarmament Commission composed of representatives of the Governments of the High Contracting Parties. Each such Government shall appoint one member of the Commission. Each member may be accompanied by substitutes and experts.

The Governments of the High Contracting Parties will inform the Secretary-General of the League of Nations of the names of their representatives, substitutes and experts on their nomination and on any changes being made.

Article 64

The Commission shall set up committees, whose number, composition and functions shall be decided by the Commission.

Article 65

The Commission may be assisted by experts chosen by itself, not being experts appointed by the High Contracting Parties to accompany their representatives.

Article 66

The members of the Commission, their substitutes and experts, and the experts and officials of the Commission, when engaged on the business of the Commission, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Article 67

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall provide the Secretariat of the Commission.

CHAPTER 2.—FUNCTIONS*Article 68*

It will be the duty of the Commission to watch the execution of the present Convention.

The Commission shall receive all the information which the High Contracting Parties are bound to communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in pursuance of their international obligations in this respect. The Commission may request the High Contracting Parties to supply, in writing or verbally, any supplementary particulars or explanations in regard to the said information which it may consider necessary.

Article 69

The Commission may take into account any other information which may reach it from a responsible source and which it may consider worth attention.

Article 70

The Commission shall be entitled to have any person heard or consulted who is in a position to throw any light on the question which is being examined by the Commission.

Article 71

Any High Contracting Party whose attitude may have been the subject of criticism shall be entitled to request the Commission to conduct in his territory such investigations as may be necessary in order to verify the execution of the obligations of the said Party under the present Convention.

On the receipt of such a request, the Commission shall meet at once in order to give effect to it, to determine the scope of the investigation within the limits of the criticism which has been made, and to lay down the conditions in which the investigation is to take place.

Article 72

At the request of one or more of the High Contracting Parties, the Commission may decide to have investigations of alleged infractions of the Convention conducted on the territory of any High Contracting Party.

On the receipt of such a request, the Commission shall meet at once in order to take a decision upon it.

Its decision, which will determine the scope of the investigation, shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Commission, whether present at the meeting or not.

Article 73

The result of the investigations decided upon in accordance with Article 72 or 73 shall be embodied in each case in a special report by the Commission.

The High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the conclusions of the report.

Article 74

Independently of the investigations referred to in Articles 72 and 73, the Commission shall be entitled to conduct periodic investigations in regard to States which have made a special agreement to that effect.

Article 75

The Commission shall make, at least once a year, a report showing the situation as regards the execution of the present Convention and containing any observations which this situation may suggest to it.

Article 76

If one of the High Contracting Parties is of opinion that the provisions of the present Convention have been infringed, or that a threat of infringement exists, such Party may address a complaint to the Commission.

The Commission will invite the High Contracting Party whose attitude has produced the complaint to supply it with all explanations which may be useful. The Commission will proceed to investigate the matter and may employ with this object the various methods of obtaining information provided for in the present Convention.

The Commission will draw up as soon as possible a reasoned report on the result of its investigation.

The High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the conclusions of the report.

Article 77

Each member of the Commission shall be entitled to require that, in any report by the Commission, account shall be taken of the opinions or suggestions put forward by him, if necessary, in the form of a separate report.

Article 78

All reports by the Commission shall be immediately communicated to the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League of Nations and published.

Article 79

The Commission shall prepare, for submission to the High Contracting Parties, such agreements as may be necessary to ensure the execution of the present Convention.

Article 80

The Commission shall make preparations for the conference to be held in accordance with Article 95 of the present Convention in order to facilitate the subsequent stages of disarmament.

Article 81

The Commission shall in general carry out any preliminary studies which may appear useful for the execution of its duties.

Article 82

Within the limits of its functions, the Commission shall supply the Council of the League of Nations with any information and advice which the Council may request of it.

CHAPTER 3.—OPERATION

Article 83

The Commission shall meet for the first time, on being summoned by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, within three months from the entry into force of the present Convention, to elect a provisional President and Vice-President and to draw up its Rules of Procedure.

Thereafter it shall meet at least once a year in ordinary session on the date fixed in its Rules of Procedure.

It shall also meet in extraordinary session:

- (1) When such a meeting is prescribed by the present Convention;
- (2) If its Bureau so decides, either of its own motion or on the request of one of the High Contracting Parties;
- (3) On the request of the Council of the League of Nations.

Article 84

The High Contracting Parties will furnish the delegates of the Commission who are entrusted with the investigations referred to in Articles 72, 73 and 75 with the necessary facilities for the execution of their mission. The Parties will employ the means at their disposal to secure the attendance of any witnesses whom the delegates of the Commission may wish to hear.

Article 85

Except where otherwise provided by the present Convention, the decisions of the Commission shall be taken by a majority of the members present at the meeting.

A minority report may be drawn up.

Article 86

The general expenditure of the Commission shall form the subject of a special chapter in the budget of the League of Nations.

The High Contracting Parties who are not members of the League shall bear a reasonable share of the said expenditure. An agreement to this effect will be reached between these Parties and the Secretary-General of the Commission.

The travelling expenses and subsistence allowances of the members of the Commission, their substitutes and experts, shall be paid by their respective Governments.

The Commission shall draw up regulations relating to the expenditure necessitated by its work.

SECTION II.—DEROGATIONS

Article 87

Should any of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, or should a change of circumstances constitute, in the opinion of any High Contracting Party, a menace to his national security, such Party may suspend temporarily, in so far as he is concerned, any provision or provisions of the present Convention, other than those contained in Articles 30, 34 and 47 to 63, provided that:

(a) Such High Contracting Party shall immediately notify the other High Contracting Parties, and at the same time the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of such temporary suspension and of the extent thereof;

(b) In the event of the suspension's being based upon a change of circumstances, the High Contracting Party concerned shall, simultaneously with the said notification, communicate to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Permanent Disarmament Commission a full explanation of such change of circumstances.

Thereupon the other High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the situation thus presented.

When the reasons for such temporary suspension have ceased to exist, the said High Contracting Party shall reduce his armaments to the level agreed upon in the Convention and shall make immediate notification to the other High Contracting Parties.

SECTION III.—FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 88

It is hereby declared that the loyal execution of the present Convention is a matter of common interest to the High Contracting Parties.

Article 89

The present Convention is not to be interpreted as restricting the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations—in particular, those which fix the powers of the Council and the Assembly.

Article 90

If a dispute arises between two or more of the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Convention, and cannot be settled either directly between the parties or by some other method of friendly settlement, the parties will, at the request of any one of them, submit such dispute to the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, or to an arbitral tribunal chosen by them.

Article 91

The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional methods. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

The present Convention shall come into force, for each Party whose instrument of ratification has been deposited, as soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by (list to be drawn up by the Conference).

Article 92

Each of the High Contracting Parties will take the necessary measures for carrying the provisions of the present Convention into effect as soon as it has come into force for such Party.

Article 93

Except as provided in the following paragraphs of this article, the present Convention shall remain in force for five years from the date on which it comes into force in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 92.

Chapter 2 of Section II of Part II (Naval Armaments), and Table II annexed to Section I of Part II (Naval Effectives) shall remain in force until December 31, 1936.

The rules referred to in Article 30 remain in force, as provided in Article 23 of the Treaty of London, without limit of time. Article 34 and Sections I, II and III of Part IV shall also remain in force without limit of time.

Article 94

Not later than years from the date on which the present Convention comes into force, a conference of the High Contracting Parties shall meet at Geneva. It will be the duty of the said conference to prepare and conclude a new Convention, which will replace the present Convention and will carry on the work of the limitation and reduction of armaments begun by the present Convention.

Article 95

The present Convention, together with the further Conventions to be concluded in accordance with Article 95 and Article 32, will replace, as between the respective Parties to the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly, those provisions of Part V (Military, Naval and Air Clauses) of each of the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon, and of Part IV (Military, Naval and Air Clauses) of the Treaty of Neuilly, which at present limit the arms and armed forces of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria respectively.

ANNEX III

MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION, JUNE 7, 1933

REPORT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATE ON
REGULATION OF THE TRADE IN AND PRIVATE AND STATE
MANUFACTURE OF ARMS AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR

Mr. RIDDELL (Canada) took the opportunity to thank the Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and the Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War for its progress report, which had so clearly placed before the General Commission the different aspects of the problem under consideration.

It was no exaggeration to say that, since the inception of the League of Nations, no question in the whole field of disarmament had received more continuous attention than the private manufacture of arms. This was due in a large measure to the very common belief that the private manufacture of arms was a menacing source of international intrigue, threatening the peace of the world. The records of the various committees of the League dealing with the subject showed that the solution of the problem was not easy. The difficulties had been at least partly due to the fact that the States concerned fell into three categories, each with differing interests. In the first place, there were the countries where the manufacture of arms was largely in the hands of the State; in the second place, there were the countries where the manufacture of arms was mostly carried on through the private manufacturer; in the third place, there were the countries which imported their armaments from the two former groups of States.

The Canadian delegation had always considered that, so long as private manufacture was retained, similar regulation was necessary for the three groups of countries, and especially for the first two groups, if a satisfactory agreement was to be reached.

A great obstacle to progress had been removed when certain countries with State manufacture accepted the principle that similar regulation regarding publicity should be applied to both State and private manufacture.

With regard to the first question submitted to the Commission—"Ought the private manufacture of arms to be abolished?"—Mr. Riddell observed that the Canadian delegation was not a member of the Committee that had recently been studying the matter, but he was pleased to inform the General Commission that it was the conviction of the Government of Canada that, in order to remove one of the dangerous factors in international relations—namely, private gain from the manufacture of and trade in arms—the manufacture of arms should eventually be restricted to State-owned establishments. At the same time the Canadian Government fully realized that it would be necessary to accept a certain delay in the application of that principle, in order to give the States at present depending on private manufacture time to make the necessary adjustments.

With regard to the second question—"Ought the manufacture of arms to be internationalized?"—the Government of Canada regarded the internationalization of the manufacture of arms as wholly impracticable, and the Canadian delegation would therefore have to vote against such a proposal.

To return to question 1, certain provisional measures would seem to be necessary for regulating the trade in and manufacture of arms in the interval preceding the complete abolition of the private manufacture of arms. Those

measures should deal as fairly with the countries depending on private manufacture as with the countries depending on State manufacture. This, in the opinion of the Canadian delegation, implied similar regulations governing manufacture to both groups of countries.

Most of those present were familiar with the very suggestive document prepared by the Secretariat,¹ to which reference had already been made, showing the analogies between the problem of the traffic in narcotic drugs and that of the trade in and manufacture of arms, and covering such questions as publicity, restrictions on transit, and supervision. The Conference for the limitation of the manufacture of narcotic drugs, 1931, at which Mr. Riddell had been one of the representatives of his country, had had a task somewhat similar to the one with which the General Commission was at present confronted. Irrespective of whether it was under State or private control, the Conference set out to limit the manufacture of narcotic drugs to the world's needs.

Once a limit had been fixed, in the draft Disarmament Convention, to the quantities of munitions and armaments which a country might possess, there would seem to be no insuperable difficulty in the way of applying certain of the principles laid down in the 1931 Narcotic Drugs Convention to the trade in and manufacture of arms and munitions. The proposal to apply these principles to that problem, which had already received support from the Spanish and United States delegations, should, in the opinion of the Canadian delegation, be thoroughly explored, with the least possible delay.

¹ Document Conf. D. 159.

ANNEX IV

CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS: BUREAU OF THE CONFERENCE

PROVISIONAL MINUTES OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH MEETING, ⁽¹⁾ HELD AT GENEVA
ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1933, AT 10.30 A.M.

Chairman: The Right Hon. ARTHUR HENDERSON.

The CHAIRMAN reminded the Bureau that at a meeting on Monday, the 9th October, he had made a statement with regard to the conversations and negotiations which he had been authorized to carry through by a decision of the General Commission on the 29th June. He had intimated that, in spite of all the efforts that had been made, one or two points had not yielded to negotiation. It had been thought that further conversations might be necessary, and he understood that those conversations had been carried on since the last meeting of the Bureau. The Bureau would, he felt sure, be most anxious to hear the result, and he could not do better than ask Sir John Simon, as being responsible for the Draft Convention submitted by the Prime Minister of Great Britain in March, to make a statement as to the present position.

Before doing so, however, he desired to inform the Bureau that M. Motta had expressed regret at being unable to attend the meeting.

Sir JOHN SIMON made the following statement:—

Mr. Henderson has invited me to give some account of the conversations to which I have been a party from time to time during recent weeks, both at

¹ These minutes of the meeting of the Bureau of October 14 were circulated in this "provisional" form for the General Commission meeting of October 16. As far as is known, no corrections have been made in them.

Geneva and elsewhere, and in which the participants have attempted to ascertain by means of a friendly exchange of views what are the prospects of reaching agreement on various vital matters. I will do the best I can to comply with the President's request. I feel that I should speak plainly and frankly, for the time has gone by for glossing over difficulties by vague optimistic phrases. A system of agreed disarmament promptly entered into and loyally carried out would, I believe, be of the greatest value to the world; but I am equally clear that nothing is gained by interminable discussions which do not face essential matters on which differences may still exist.

The account which I have to render is as follows:—

So far as the United Kingdom representatives are concerned, we have taken part in meetings, at different times, with the French, German, Italian and American representatives, as well as in a number of talks with the representatives of some other Powers. These conversations have led me to take the view that the Draft Convention which the United Kingdom Government put before the General Commission over six months ago, and which has been unanimously adopted as the general framework for the proposed agreement, will require to be in some respects recast. The Draft Convention is at present drafted to cover a period of five years; the discussions which I am summarising indicate on the part of some Powers a wish that the period should be extended to perhaps eight years, and, so far as I recall, no serious objection to this extension has been raised.

It was further proposed that this total period of eight years should be occupied by the fulfilment of a continuous programme, designed to secure at the end of the period two essential conditions: (a) A substantial measure of disarmament actually realized and completed on the part of the heavily-armed Powers, and (b) the achievement of the principle of equality in a régime of security which, ever since December of last year, has been the declared objective not only of the Powers who signed the Declaration of the 11th December, but of the Disarmament Conference itself. But, in order to attain this, it is necessary to proceed by steps. Indeed, the method of stages has from a very early date been adopted as the necessary method by the general vote of the Conference. And when I speak of a program which would gradually unfold in action so as to secure at the end of the period these two essential conditions, I recall the language of Mr. Henderson, in his report to the Bureau on the 9th October last, when he declared: "On some of the more important questions, the approach is manifestly influenced by the present unsettled state of Europe and the ensuing distrust, fears and alarms." The present unsettled state of Europe is a fact, and statesmen, in drawing up their plans, have to face facts. The need, therefore, for modifying the Draft Convention so as to accomplish this purpose by a process of evolution is clearly established.

The scheme, therefore, which emerged for consideration, as the result of a number of these interviews, was one in which the proposed period of eight years would begin with the transformation of continental armies on the lines set out in the British draft, together with the setting up, through the medium of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of an adequate system of supervision, so that the sense of security, which the due observance of the Convention will afford, should provide the groundwork for the practical attainment of the twin ideas of disarmament and equality. Mr. Henderson has suggested that the Permanent Disarmament Commission might be set up as soon as the Convention is signed without waiting for ratification. If this suggestion is found feasible it ought to be welcomed for it aims at shortening the period when actual disarmament and attained equality would be effectively reached. It is understood on all hands that the supervision contemplated would be of general application. Its purpose would be to ensure that the undertakings contained in the Convention were being loyally observed. It is a matter for

close consideration to determine how much of the eight years would be needed for the initial steps, to which I have referred. Transformation of armies involves technical questions which will govern the time-table, and in the meantime a real feeling of confidence should develop, when it is seen that the whole plan is agreed to and is in due process of execution. I must report that the period of four years was mentioned by several Governments, though others have raised the question whether it could not be somewhat shortened.

Whatever the length of this first stage may be, it is essential to make clear that the Convention itself would have to contain at the time of its signature the detailed scheme of disarmament provided for as the final result to be attained by the time its full period of, say, eight years comes to an end. I have described that disarmament as "substantial" and the extent of it has been the subject of detailed discussion. Since general phrases will not advance matters I add that by "substantial" disarmament is meant either the disarmament provided for in the United Kingdom Draft Convention or some comparable variation of it. I say quite definitely that the whole scheme would not be satisfactory to my Government and we could not lend our own support to it unless the degree of disarmament by the heavily armed Powers is both fully defined in the Convention and really adequate. But there is another feature in the second stage of the plan which is equally definite—it is this: The result of the abolition of various kinds of armament and of prohibition against their further use will be to constitute a common list of permitted arms, which would become the same for all countries and thus the differential position of the Powers whose armaments were limited by the Peace Treaties would finally cease. Quantities, and other detailed regulations, would, of course, be in each case the subject of negotiation and agreement.

The Bureau will therefore see that the plan I have outlined is one which, if it were adopted and loyally observed, would bring into practical operation the principle of equality of status by the method of substantial disarmament on the one hand, and the application to all countries of a common list of prohibited arms on the other.

But this programme involves a feature which appears to me to be essential. I must state it with complete frankness to the Bureau. The scheme involves the principle that the Powers now under restriction of the Peace Treaties should not begin to increase their armaments forthwith, but should express their willingness to conform to a time-table such as I have indicated. The Government of the United Kingdom take the view that agreement could not be reached on the basis of a Convention which would provide for any immediate rearmament. In speaking of "no rearmament," I do not mean to dispute the reasonableness, as the Reichswehr is transformed into a more numerous short-service army, of a proportional numerical increase in its armament. And there should be from the beginning of the Convention an agreement that no Government will manufacture or acquire any further weapons of any of the types to be eventually abolished.

In our view, therefore, for the reasons indicated by Mr. Henderson in the passage I have quoted, the attainment of the object which we all have in view at the Disarmament Conference must be in accordance with a regular programme. We earnestly desire to establish, by international agreement, the attainment of equality of status and we point out that it is attained in a most complete and effective way by providing for disarmament through the adoption and loyal fulfilment of such a programme as I have indicated. By accepting the principle of no immediate rearmament and co-operating with the rest of us in framing a Convention which is best calculated to restore the sense of confidence which has recently been so rudely shaken, the necessary conditions of success can be established.

The statement I have been asked to make has necessarily involved some plain speaking and a perfectly clear declaration of our own point of view. I feel that if the General Commission, which meets on Monday, is now to do useful work,

it is most desirable to ascertain what is the view of other countries on these essential points, and I sincerely trust that we may thus find a way of removing the obstacles which at present stand in the way of an agreed Convention.

Mr. NORMAN DAVIS (United States of America) pointed out that Sir John Simon's statement contained an account of conversations in many of which he himself had participated. It also contained a very definite indication of the modifications Sir John Simon felt should be introduced into the United Kingdom Draft Convention to make it more generally acceptable. Mr. Norman Davis was glad to be able to confirm Sir John Simon's account of the conversations and to endorse and support the position he had taken up on the important questions of substance before the Bureau for immediate decision. He was the better able to give his support to the statement just made, because as a result of the frequent and exhaustive conversations he had had during the past few days with Sir John Simon, they had come to the common conclusions so clearly and forcibly expressed in that statement.

It was not difficult for Mr. Norman Davis to state his position in that frank and unequivocal manner. The report that had been laid before the Bureau, both in its broad outlines and in many of the points of detail, was in agreement with the position of the American Government as set forth in the communication which President Roosevelt had addressed to the Heads of Government represented at the Conference in May last, and with the statement which he himself had made in the General Commission a few days later. In those statements, his Government had taken the position that a Disarmament Convention could not properly be made an instrument for rearmament and that qualitative equality in armaments should primarily be sought through the reduction of the armaments of the heavily-armed Powers and not through action on the part of others to attempt to build up. Under present conditions, steps were necessary in attaining that equality. It could not be achieved at one stroke.

He would not attempt to restate on that or on other points the position which had been so adequately presented to the Bureau. He only wished to emphasize one point to help reassure those who were impatient or sceptical because of the long delay; from the conversations in which many of the members of the Bureau had recently participated, he was more than ever convinced of the sincere purpose of the more heavily-armed countries to make effective measures of disarmament a reality. He would add that no treaty would be satisfactory, as far as his Government was concerned, or would justify its participation in a system of supervision designed to ensure its faithful observance unless that treaty contained precise provisions for such measures of disarmament.

M. DI SORAGNA (Italy) made the following declaration:—

The Italian delegation thanks Sir John Simon for his very clear and full statement on the present position of the very serious question with which we are dealing. We also thank him for the programme of work he has indicated and which we deduce from his remarks.

We shall be very glad once more to join our efforts to those of all the other delegations on the lines he has laid down. We are hopeful and confident that the world may find in this programme, as we do, a positive basis for the subsequent work which has still to be done in achieving the aim to which we all look forward in the same spirit of conciliation and peace.

M. PAUL-BONCOUR (France) thought it would be insulting to Sir John Simon and Mr. Norman Davis to thank them for the frankness of their statements. Sir John Simon had given an account of the conversations he had had with the representatives of various Powers. He had observed—and M. Paul-Boncour also desired to emphasize this—that the conversations had taken place

at the specific invitation of the Bureau and the Chairman. The delegate of France was quite convinced that the questions to which the conversations had related affected all the Powers represented on the Bureau. It was therefore impossible to settle them in restricted conversations. It was for the Conference itself to take decisions. However, it had been considered essential to diminish certain difficulties by preliminary exchanges of view.

Sir John Simon's statement, Mr. Norman Davis's confirmation and M. di Soragna's support showed that the results achieved were sufficiently consistent to permit of the most ample hopes.

Sir John Simon was well qualified to explain those results in view, on the one hand, of the present situation, and, on the other, of the procedure approved by the General Commission. Indeed, a United Kingdom plan reproducing certain fundamental provisions of an earlier French plan had been adopted as the basis of the General Commission's work. The plan had been given a first reading. It had then been ascertained that, if a second reading were to be fruitful, it was essential to take account of the reservations made by various delegations, in particular, by the French delegation, and also of certain political events which the Disarmament Conference could not overlook. Sir John Simon had definitely stated that the original United Kingdom plan must be amended and revised. In his statement he had indicated the main points to which revision should be directed. M. Paul-Boncour desired in the Bureau of the Conference to give the French Government's support to some of the principles specifically mentioned by Sir John Simon.

Sir John Simon had pointed out that it was impossible to contemplate satisfactory progress and a successful final outcome of the work of the Conference, that was to say, the conclusion of a Convention, without taking account of the present political situation in Europe. Indeed, in spite of the technical character of certain of the General Commission's discussions, there was no doubt that the whole discussion was dominated by political considerations. Considerations of that kind had always occupied the attention of the French delegation, which, at the beginning of the Conference, had proposed and brought about the constitution of a Political Commission.

M. Paul-Boncour believed that one of the fundamental ideas of Sir John Simon's statement was the division of the period for the execution of the Convention into two stages. The intention, during the first of those stages, would be to acquire experience of the system of supervision. That first stage was governed not only by the political considerations to which Sir John Simon had referred, but also by the necessity of testing both the value and results of supervision. Supervision was, indeed, the central idea of the plan towards which the Conference was at present turning its attention. That idea was connected with the idea of security, which, in the opinion of certain delegations, among them the French delegation, was inseparable from the pursuit of the equality of rights. But supervision was a valuable and efficacious means of achieving that object, especially if it was accompanied by respect for undertakings entered into in the Convention and was bound up with the idea of security. As it was necessary to create an atmosphere of confidence, it was essential in the first place to ascertain by observation the value and results of supervision. That principle involved one inevitable consequence. If it was adopted, there must be no rearmament during its application, for, if there were, the very object of all the efforts that were made would be nullified. It was necessary, on the contrary, immediately to enter into definite undertakings so that at the end of the period laid down in the Convention a substantial reduction of armaments would be registered and equality would be brought about by the general reduction of armaments. Although the time had not yet come to give figures, M.

Paul-Boncour desired to indicate at once that the period of four years to which Sir John Simon had referred had not been selected arbitrarily. It was based on a number of considerations to which the French delegation attached very great importance.

M. Paul-Boncour would refrain from expressing hopes for that success for which all his colleagues desired. He would confine himself to saying that, in his opinion, it was essential to ascertain whether the General Commission was really in agreement with the bases just indicated, which would hold good only if they were accepted by most of the Powers represented there.

BARON VON RHEINBABEN (Germany) said that in the absence of M. Nadolny he desired to limit his observations to the following declaration:—

“I take it for granted that the Bureau is aware that the view of the German Government on disarmament is marked by two claims or elements: (a) Real and substantial disarmament, of the highly-armed Powers; and (b) the immediate practical application of equality of status, the question of quantity being open for negotiation. In this sense, I have taken note of the very important statement of Sir John Simon and shall report it at once to my Government.”

M. BOURQUIN (Belgium) said that the Belgian delegation unreservedly concurred in the ideas expressed by Sir John Simon and supported by those who had spoken after him. It seemed to him absolutely essential that the efforts of the Conference should not end in rearmament. Moreover, he was convinced that a first stage such as that contemplated was absolutely indispensable in the present state of affairs as it would give experience in the working of the Convention. It would be useless to build on nothing. The realities must be faced. But undoubtedly there was at present such a feeling of anxiety as might paralyse any attempt at disarmament unless guarantees calculated to allay it were obtained.

M. Bourquin noted that once again a problem of security had arisen, but that it appeared in a new and more clearly defined aspect. The question was one of security in disarmament, of security closely connected with measures of disarmament. It was obvious that the fundamental condition of that form of security was to be found in the organisation of real, practical and efficacious supervision.

With regard to the length of the first stage, M. Bourquin supported M. Paul-Boncour's observations. When the period had been fixed the technical conditions of supervision would have to be taken into account in order to judge of its efficacy.

M. BENES (Czechoslovakia), speaking as both *rapporteur* and representative of Czechoslovakia, desired to make two observations with regard to Sir John Simon's statement.

The first was an observation of form. In his opinion the second reading of the United Kingdom draft could only usefully be embarked upon if certain questions of principle were settled first. Among these questions he mentioned: (a) the duration of the Convention and the establishment of a graduated plan divided into two stages; (b) effective permanent and general supervision; and (c) prohibited or permitted arms and no rearmament.

The second observation related to the substance of the problem. M. Benes unreservedly concurred in the ideas expressed by Sir John Simon with regard to the three points he had just mentioned. He specially desired to emphasise his agreement in that connexion, as he was convinced that if those questions were not settled the General Commission would be unable to continue its work.

M. POLITIS (Greece) replied on behalf of his Government to the question Sir John Simon had asked at the end of his statement. He was in complete agreement with Sir John Simon as to the two fundamental principles to which the latter had referred. With regard to the principle of no rearmament, that was a question which settled itself. It had been repeated on many occasions since the beginning of the Conference that it would be disastrous to the Conference and to its standing in public opinion if its efforts led to rearmament. The second question was the establishment of a first experimental period. In M. Politis's opinion, it was absolutely essential for the purpose of creating a feeling of security, the need for which had often been indicated during the Conference's discussions.

M. Politis hoped that agreement would speedily be reached on that point; otherwise the General Commission would be unable to continue with its work. Once agreement had been achieved, it would be necessary to work quickly, proceeding to adapt the United Kingdom's plan on the two bases just mentioned.

THE CHAIRMAN reminded the Bureau that Sir John Simon had concluded his statement with the following words:—

"It is most desirable to ascertain what is the view of other countries on these essential points. . ."

It appeared to the Chairman that, after the expressions of opinion the Bureau had just heard, it ought to decide to transmit Sir John Simon's report to the General Commission not only for information, but also as a subject for discussion.

If there were no objection to that procedure, a full report of the morning's proceedings would be sent to the General Commission as early as possible in order that the latter might open its discussion on Sir John Simon's report at its next meeting on the following Monday.

(The procedure proposed by the Chairman was adopted.)

(The meeting rose.)

II

Telegram from the German Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Henderson

BERLIN, October 14, 1933.

On behalf of the German Government, I have the honour to make to you the following communication:—

In the light of the course which recent discussions of the Powers concerned have taken in the matter of disarmament, it is now clear that the Disarmament Conference will not fulfil what is its sole object, namely, general disarmament. It is also clear that this failure of the conference is due solely to the unwillingness on the part of the highly-armed States to carry out their contractual obligation to disarm. This renders impossible the satisfaction of Germany's recognised claim to equality of rights, and the condition on which the German Government agreed at the beginning of this year again to take part in the work of the conference thus no longer exists.

The German Government is accordingly compelled to leave the Disarmament Conference.

BARON VON NEURATH.

III

Telegram in reply from Mr. Henderson to Baron von Neurath's Telegram of October 14, 1933

I HAVE now communicated to the General Commission your Excellency's telegram of the 14th October announcing the decision of the German Government to discontinue participation in the work of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and indicating the reasons for that decision.

The German Government took this step at a moment when the Bureau had just decided to submit to the General Commission a definite programme. This programme, to be completed within a limited period, provided for the realisation progressively, in accordance with Resolutions of the Conference in which Germany herself concurred, of reductions of armaments comparable to those contemplated in the Draft Convention submitted to the General Commission.

This programme provided also, with corresponding measures of security, for the realisation of Equality of Rights, which the Germans have always placed in the forefront of their demands.

I regret therefore that this grave decision should have been taken by your Government for reasons which I am unable to accept as valid.

HENDERSON,

*President of the Conference for the
Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.*

GENEVA, October 16, 1933.

ANNEX V

**MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR
TO THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR ON JANUARY 1, 1934**

(Published in Paris on February 1, 1934)

(Translation.)

On several occasions the German Government had expressed the wish to which its Head had given particularly solemn emphasis, to see negotiations opened between France and Germany, in which the difficulties which may exist between the two countries should be settled.

No less clearly the French Government has replied to these overtures. It has affirmed its intention of examining, with a sincere desire of achieving results, all proposals which might be formulated in the general interest of peace and in a real spirit of international collaboration. The French Ambassador has been instructed to express the desire to see the intentions manifested by the Chancellor given concrete shape in a manner sufficiently complete for the Government of the Republic to be in a position to appreciate the possibilities of success for the negotiations.

The German Government has been good enough to agree to these views. Declarations have been made to the French Ambassador; information has been given to him both verbally and in writing. Such information now allows the French Government, after having proceeded to the more detailed examination which the Ambassador had foreshadowed, to pronounce itself on the various points that have so far come under consideration.

Dealing only with the German Government's propositions themselves and without discussing for the moment the general considerations cited in support of these proposals, particularly in regard to the state of Germany's armaments, the Government of the Republic is sincerely glad to learn that the German Government is ready to conclude pacts of non-aggression with all its neighbours; it goes without saying, moreover, that the conclusion of such pacts would only be opportune in so far as, while in no way detracting from the guarantees of security resulting from agreements already in force, and in particular the Locarno Agreements, the conclusion of such pacts would be capable of adding new guarantees furnishing protection to the signatories both from any threat against their external independence and from any attempt at interference in their internal affairs.

Similarly, the Government of the Republic notes with satisfaction the German Government's acceptance, at least in principle, of automatic and periodic supervision on the spot, a supervision equal in its reciprocity, without which, in point of fact, any international convention concerning armaments would be inoperative. It remains, moreover, to lay down precise details of the manner of its application, and the French Government would be glad to know whether Germany accepts the measures contemplated in the course of the recent work of the Committees at Geneva, in which she unfortunately did not participate.

But, under reserve of details to be worked out later and on which agreement seems possible, one question of paramount importance has held our attention, and we must explain our point of view in all frankness.

At the same time as the Reich affirms its goodwill within such conditions as should facilitate a settlement of the present difficulties, it feels obliged in regard to armaments to announce a programme of claims which run directly counter to the principles sanctioned hitherto by the Geneva Conference with the assent of the German delegation itself and expressly envisaged by the declaration of the Powers of the 11th December, 1932, to which the German Government constantly refers.

Germany and ourselves have been associated in the work of the Conference, whose object is to achieve by stages a substantial reduction of armaments. Now, what the German Government seems to contemplate at this stage is a no less substantial rearmament, which is represented as only being possibly deferred as a result of financial considerations.

From the details which the German Government has been good enough to communicate, it appears, indeed, not only that Germany asks for permanent effectives to be raised to 300,000 men, but even that this figure of 300,000 men would be far from representing the total of the military forces which it would have at its disposal at any moment without having to have recourse to any measure of mobilisation.

There must be added, in fact, an important fraction of police effectives, the military nature of whose organisations has been recognised in the earlier work of the Conference, and whose suppression does not seem contemplated in spite of the considerable increase of permanent effectives which would result in the programme contemplated by the German Government.

There must be added to the above the para-military organisations which have not ceased to multiply for some years and which since the arrival in power of the present régime have so far developed and gained in consistency that, independently of the political considerations which the German Government urges and of which it is the only judge, these organisations raise a military problem which cannot be eluded.

The French Government must remark indeed that at least a great part of the men belonging to these organisations receive advanced military instruction from cadres furnished by the Reichswehr or trained by it; that if they are not

all armed in a permanent fashion they are at least trained in the handling of engines of war; that they are at any moment at the disposal of their chiefs; that their equipment, except for the carrying of a rifle, is in every respect comparable with military equipment; that beside the infantry units these organisations now include mechanised units, cavalry units and engineers; that their organisations and their division into localities are closely based on those of the army (companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, military areas).

In these conditions, whatever may be the political preoccupations quoted, the possibility of military utilisation of these organisations appears undeniable and the French Government can only maintain, in accordance with the previous decisions of the Conference, that any convention for the limitation of armaments which, in calculating effectives, did not take into account the existence of such formations, would not be able to set up an equitable comparison between the forces to be considered.

The French Government also notes that in respect of land and air material the German Government asks for an important measure of rearmament both of a quantitative and of a qualitative order, and asks for it immediately, invoking that equality of rights, the principle of which was recognised in the declaration of the 11th December, 1932. But this equality presupposes, in order to be practicably and equitably realised, a previous equalisation and a standardisation of the effectives allotted to each country for the defence of its territory. It is Germany herself which considers that several years are necessary to achieve this.

Finally, the French Government observes that if the German Government gives its support in principle to supervision it does not indicate from what date this supervision should begin to operate. Now, the setting-up and trying out of this supervision in conditions of complete reciprocity are the essential conditions of the loyal application of the convention; this alone can ensure that the contemplated reductions are made in mutual security.

The French Government does not consider that a convention established on such bases would meet the intentions of the Powers generally, as they have been expressed in the discussions of the Conference, and it is certainly not in this spirit that the declaration of the 11th December was signed. The French Government fears that such a convention might prepare, on the contrary, a race in armaments which the common efforts of civilised nations should tend to prevent.

It is precisely in order to set aside this danger that at the moment when Germany left the Conference, the French Government was ready to accept an adaptation of the British plan, which, while taking account of the political uneasiness existing in Europe and also the practical conditions necessary for realisation, would achieve by stages an important reduction in armaments as well as equality of rights.

The Government's intentions have not varied and it eagerly takes this opportunity to furnish the details asked for by Baron von Neurath in his last communication.

France is ready to accept an adaptation of the British plan, which would involve in the first years of application of the convention, a reduction of French effectives, to be synchronised with the transformation of the existing German forces in such a way that the two armies should be standardised on a type of defensive army with short-term service and limited effectives, in order to arrive progressively at the parity of French and German comparable effectives, that is to say, of those which are intended for the defence of the home territory.

As regards land material from the beginning of the application of the convention, France is ready to accept that all her armaments shall be restricted to their present level, and, in addition, the prohibition of all manufacture of material of a calibre or tonnage superior to those which would be authorised for all States.

At the same time, the experimental and detailed application of supervision will be made and applied to all States, both for effectives and for the manufacture or importation of material.

In a second phase of the application of the convention, on the one hand material above the common qualitative limits laid down in the convention would be progressively abolished, and on the other hand authorised material would be allowed to the States affected by the military clauses of the Peace Treaties, in accordance with a progressive scheme also to be laid down in the convention.

The French Government is ready to draw up exact figures for effectives, calibres and tonnages to be written into a convention conceived on these lines. But it is clear that these figures cannot be usefully discussed, except between all the interested Powers, and that an understanding between France and Germany alone would not be sufficient to establish them.

At the same time, in order that the German Government may be fully convinced of the importance of the reductions which would be effected in the second phase, it is possible to indicate at once that France would gladly contemplate arriving at a reduction to 15 cm. of the calibre of mobile artillery to be permitted to all States.

As regards air armaments, and in the first years of the application of the convention, France accepts not only the abolition of aerial bombardment in the conditions which the Conference defined in its Resolution of the 23rd July, 1932, but a proportional reduction of 50 per cent. of the material actually in commission, if such a general reduction were accepted by the principal air forces and accompanied by an effective control of civil aviation and aeroplane manufacture.

She considers, moreover, that the final objective of these important reductions should be the abolition of all national military aviation and its replacement by an international air force.

The main outlines of this programme, of which France is ready to discuss the details with Germany and the interested Powers, will suffice to show how inexact is the premise on which the German Government relies in order to engage the conversations along the path of rearmament. We, on the contrary, believe that a progressive disarmament is still as possible as it is desirable and that the adoption of the programme defined above, the detailed working out of which was only interrupted by the departure of Germany from the Disarmament Conference, offers, if Germany will collaborate in the study of it, the most considerable chances of achieving what should be a common objective: a general, substantial and progressive reduction of armaments freeing the world of a burden which the economic crisis renders heavier and more dangerous, and which menaces both the peace and the economic welfare of all countries.

Moreover, whatever may be the divergence of views on the essential problem, which the Chancellor's communications may have allowed to appear—a divergence which does not seem irremovable if the German Government would only convince itself that the way of armament reductions remains wide open—the Government of the Republic would regret that the diplomatic conversations for which the German Government has several times expressed a desire were not to be pursued.

The Government of the Republic has, in fact, been happy to note the assurance that the German Government was disposed at any moment to settle in a friendly manner by the most appropriate means contentious questions which could arise between France and Germany. The French Government associates itself with this sentiment. It has not ceased to practise, even at the cost of heavy sacrifices, this very necessary policy of good neighbourly relations and understanding between two great countries, whose agreement in a common work of international collaboration would be the surest guarantee of peace.

Furthermore—given that in accordance with the Chancellor's assertion no territorial claim exists any longer between the two countries—examination of the problems which face Germany and ourselves will quickly convince the German Government that the majority of them are not purely Franco-German problems but European problems, and that France in order to remain faithful to the policy of international collaboration cannot envisage them to the exclusion of the various Governments interested and of the League of Nations itself.

But in order that no doubt regarding its own way of thinking may subsist, the Government of the Republic wishes to assure the German Government that all these problems can be examined between the two Governments in a spirit of mutual comprehension, once it is quite understood that the solution is not to be worked out apart from the Governments directly interested nor in a manner contrary to the provisions of a Covenant, to which we, like them, remain devoted. Thus also it is in the League of Nations that may be found the practical application of that equality of rights which Germany claims so firmly. It is there that international co-operation can best be exercised. The French Government has over and over again proved by its actions that it did not conceive of such co-operation to the exclusion of Germany. It still hopes that the German Government will be convinced of these realities; that it will not maintain in regard to the League of Nations a decision which has been unanimously regretted and that it will not persist in an abstention, the consequences of which would be no less harmful to Germany than to the whole of the international community.

January 1, 1934.

ANNEX VI

MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN ON JANUARY 19, 1934

(Published in Berlin on February 3, 1934.)

(Translation.)

The German Government have perused the aide-mémoire communicated to them on the 1st January by the French Ambassador, with great interest. They welcome the fact that the French Government have accepted the suggestion for direct diplomatic negotiations on the problems pending between the two countries, and that on the most important and acute question, namely, the disarmament question, they have clearly set forth their attitude to the declarations of the German Government as well as the points which they themselves wish to make during the further discussion of this question. The German Government have examined the French aide-mémoire in a spirit of detachment and from the determining standpoint whether and if so what possibilities exist for the fulfilment of the idea of general disarmament. They wish to communicate the result of their examination to the French Government in all frankness because they think that this is the only way to avoid misunderstandings and to promote the understanding desired by both sides.

I.

Before the German Government deal with the criticism of the German disarmament proposal contained in the French aide-mémoire, they would like to express their views regarding the plan which the French Government submit

is a counter-proposal. If the German Government have correctly understood this plan it would in substance amount to the following:—

The French Government would divide into two phases the period of validity of the disarmament convention which is to be concluded. During the first phase, the length of which is not definitely stated, but which would at all events encompass a period of several years, France would gradually reduce the effectives of her army. This reduction would synchronize with the transformation of the German Reichswehr, until ultimately numerical equality between the effectives of the German army and the French home forces was reached. Whether France contemplates any limits in this connexion on her oversea troops is not stated in the aide-mémoire. The existing French War material on land would be maintained undiminished during the first phase. On the other hand, France would refrain from manufacturing new material which exceed in calibre or tonnage the maxima fixed by the convention. As regards military aeroplanes France would be prepared during the first phase to reduce the machines at present in service by 50 per cent, on condition that the other large airfleets underwent a similar reduction, and that effective control of civil aviation and aeroplane manufacture were introduced.

In the second phase of the convention, *i.e.*, after several years, the gradual abolition of land war material which exceeded the accepted calibre and tonnage limits would be taken in hand. Furthermore, the countries disarmed by the peace treaties would be allowed to equip themselves gradually with the types of arms approved by the convention. The details of the measures concerning war material to be executed during the second phase would be laid down in advance in the convention. But in all these steps the experience gained during the first phase, with the control procedure to be introduced, would be taken into consideration.

The French Government are of opinion that such a programme offers the best prospects of giving effect to universal, substantial and progressive disarmament and of emancipating the world from its heavy burden in the interests of peace and economic reconstruction. In order to get a clear picture, it will be necessary to realise in concrete fashion the position which would result were a convention to be established on the basis of the French plan. What would that position be?

In the important domain of war material disarmament would be postponed by several years. During that time the highly armed States would retain the whole of their heavy land material undiminished, even in so far as it came into consideration for purposes of aggression. One must ask whether from the standpoint of general security it matters much whether the highly armed States refrain from the manufacture of new heavy weapons of attack during this period? Germany would remain tied to the completely inadequate types of weapons set out in the Treaty of Versailles, and would at the same time have to proceed with the transformation of the Reichswehr during this period. How could the transformation of an army be executed in practice if the necessary material for doing so were not provided in advance? How can Germany's security be at all safeguarded during such a transformation of the Reichswehr?

To come to effectives. The adoption of a uniform type of army would depend on the acceptance by other States of the type contemplated. Furthermore, the value of the reduction in effectives conceded by France during the first period can only be assessed if we know what is to happen as regards the French oversea forces. The French system of land defence has been based for some time to an important extent on the utilisation of African troops in the home country. Consequently, a considerable portion of the French African forces are kept permanently in France. Furthermore, if the German Government are rightly informed, all the necessary measures of organisation have been

taken to bring the troops in Africa across to France at short notice. Must one not assume that the reduction of the home forces can always be made good by bringing overseas troops to the home country unless the latter are included in the effective to be reduced?

As regards air forces, one must consider whether the important principle of bringing all the great air fleets to a uniform level would not be abandoned if the method of reduction set out in the French aide-mémoire were adopted. But apart from that the question arises whether, during the first, and for that matter the second, phase of the convention, Germany is to remain deprived of any kind of military air force. If this question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the reduction of the air forces of the other States proposed in the French plan would practically make no alteration in the position of radical inequality and complete defencelessness of Germany in the air. The German Government are unable to see how this impossible position would be alleviated by the proposal to do away altogether with military aircraft at some indeterminate date in the future.

The arrangement contemplated in the aide-mémoire for the second phase would raise another important question. Are we to understand the remarks on control to mean that the whole régime during the second phase would be made to depend on the experience gathered during the first phase? Were that the intention, then the execution of general disarmament would also be attended during the second phase with a dangerous uncertainty factor. Control is to be applied, in principle, to all States uniformly. It is, however, obvious that the precondition for parity in the matter of control would not be present if this control, as a result of the radical difference in the degree of limitation, were to work out in actual practice quite differently in the countries already disarmed by the peace treaties as compared with other countries. Would it not, inasmuch as it would have a much wider field of application in the countries already disarmed, lead much more easily to differences, no matter how loyally the treaty were fulfilled, than it would in other countries, differences which could then be used to delay the second phase still further?

Even if one could get rid of this danger, the decisive question remains for Germany whether the discrimination in her case is to be prolonged for a further series of years. Can the other Powers produce any valid reason for a plan so inconsistent with the honour and security of Germany? The German Government are absolutely convinced that they cannot. The assertion in the aide-mémoire that, according to the declaration of the 11th December, 1932, Germany's equality in regard to material is dependent on the previous execution of the transformation of the Reichswehr is borne out neither by that declaration nor by any other agreements, nor by the facts. In addition to the foregoing general points of view, many points of detail in the French proposals need clarification. Some of these questions are set out in the attached *questionnaire* and the German Government would be thankful for replies to them.

II.

When the main points and consequences of the French plan are set out as in the foregoing, grave doubts arise as to whether a settlement of the disarmament problem, which is really fair or which would serve to secure peace, can be found along these lines. When everything is taken into consideration, the position seems to the German Government in much the same light to-day as a few months ago, when, as a result of the complete breakdown of Geneva methods, she saw herself forced to leave the League and the Disarmament Conference and decided to make a new offer. The German Government most deeply regret that the French Government have not appreciated the genesis

of that offer in their remarks in the aide-mémoire. It was not because they are abandoning the idea of disarmament and in its place wish to promote the rearmament of Germany that the German Government made their proposal. They must emphasise again that there is nothing which Germany desires so urgently as universal disarmament to the utmost possible degree. The German Government would still regard it as the best solution were all countries to reduce their armaments to the extent contemplated by the Treaty of Versailles. That would be the simplest solution of the question of German equality. At all events, there is no measure in the domain of quantitative or qualitative disarmament, no matter how far-reaching, which Germany would not be ready to accept at once if it would be carried out in the same way by all the other States. This unambiguous declaration, so often repeated, entitles the German Government to refute, with all possible emphasis, the allegation that the real aim of their policy is the rearmament of Germany.

If the proposal of the German Government aimed at seeking a first and rapid settlement on the basis of a limitation of the armaments of the highly armed States at the present level of their armaments, this was only because, in their opinion, the passage of almost eight years' continuous negotiations has clearly shown that the highly armed Powers chiefly concerned are not at present, for one reason or another, ready for a really trenchant disarmament. Even in the aide-mémoire of the 1st January such a disarmament is not contemplated. It is, however, naturally, not the intention of the German proposal to put on one side those individual measures of disarmament on which an immediate agreement appears possible. On the contrary, the German Government want nothing more than that far-reaching limitations of armaments should be laid down in the settlement which they propose. As, however, the German Government understand the position to-day, these limitations will in no way reach an extent that will result in an immediate grant to Germany of equality rights in accordance with the declaration of the 11th December, 1932. If one faces this reality, there is no other way out, in order to reach an early settlement by treaty, than to lay down the measures of disarmament on which agreement is possible at the present moment, to limit the armaments of the highly armed States for the period of the first convention to their present level and to arrive at Germany's equality of rights by a certain adjustment of her armaments to the level of armaments in other countries. This proposal aims, therefore, at nothing else than drawing the consequences from a position which exists, but through no fault of Germany. It cannot be proposed that Germany shall take upon herself alone the consequences of this position by remaining subjected for years to unilateral limitations of armaments which are not applicable to other States and which have no relation to the level of armaments in those States.

It is, moreover, impossible to see how the execution of the German proposal could entail an armaments race. It would be for Germany only a question of creating a defensive army which could not in the remotest degree constitute a threat to any other country. In addition, the German proposal specifically provides that for all States a fixed armaments limit should be laid down by treaty, by which means the possibility of an armaments race would from the outset be excluded.

Even less can the German Government recognise the objection that the figure of 300,000 men is too high for the German defensive army. This figure represents, in regard to the geographical circumstances, particularly in regard to the length and nature of the German frontier, the minimum which Germany in present circumstances requires for her security. This becomes particularly clear when one compares this figure with the armaments of the highly armed States neighbouring Germany, of which, besides France, the States allied to her—Poland, Czechoslovakia and Belgium—must chiefly be taken into con-

sideration. In this connexion it must be remembered that all these countries have at their disposal not only very great active armies, but also powerful masses of trained reserves, because since the end of the war, on the ground of the universal military service in force in those countries, they have given training in the army to the whole of the youth which is fit for military service. These reserves, who have behind them a completed military training in the army, who moreover are obliged to take part in exercises and to serve in war, whose names are listed and recorded, and who in part may be called to the colours without mobilisation, run to about 5 millions in France alone.

Germany has no comparable factor to set off against the trained reserves of other countries. In particular, it is impossible to put the political organisations existing in Germany on the same footing as the military reserves of other countries. It has already been repeatedly explained to the French Ambassador that the S.A. and S.S. formations have no military character. In addition, the German Government have already declared themselves ready to submit the non-military character of the formations in question to the proposed international control, in so far as other countries undertake a like obligation in regard to their similar organisations. By this means any danger that Germany should exceed the treaty strength of her army indirectly by means of the political organisations would be effectively prevented.

As regards the question of the police, it should not be difficult to reach an understanding. In the view of the German Government the number and density of the population, as well as the particular circumstances of individual States (number of large towns, social conditions, &c.), should be taken into account.

Finally, in considering the figure of 300,000, account should also be taken of the fact that it would be a question of soldiers with a short period of service, whereas the Reichswehr is composed of professional soldiers with twelve years' service. The French Government themselves have always expressed the opinion in the Geneva negotiations that the military value of short-service soldiers is to be regarded as considerably less than that of professional soldiers. From this point of view also it would be an erroneous view to regard the figure of 300,000 men as a substantial increase in the present defensive strength of Germany.

As regards the objections made in the aide-mémoire to the equipment of the future German army with weapons of defence, which is held by the German Government to be necessary, it has already been stated above that the transformation of the Reichswehr into an army of short service cannot be accomplished, in practice, unless this army is given the necessary weapons simultaneously with the transformation. If it was proposed first of all to transform the Reichswehr and only in a later period to arm it with the defensive weapons to be laid down in the convention, not only would the gravest difficulties of organisation be created, but the result would above all be that the army would during the first years be in no way capable of fulfilling its task of defending the country.

Finally, as regards details of the scheme of control to be laid down in the convention, it is here a matter of technical questions, regarding which it will not be difficult to reach agreement as soon as the main material points of the disarmament problem are cleared up. On the assumption that complete parity were to be established, it would, in the opinion of the German Government, be only natural that the control should begin to function simultaneously with the entry into force of the convention.

III

The foregoing remarks show that the principal points in which the views of the two Governments on the disarmament problem still differ are those regarding the reckoning of the strength of the personnel and the date of the

equipment of the future German army with defensive weapons. In both questions, however, in the opinion of the German Government, the required solution will present itself automatically, provided that the technical, legal and moral points of view which enter into the question are impartially examined. The French Government cannot fail to recognize that that which the German Government feel bound to demand in this connexion remains far less than that which Germany would have to be granted if equality of rights were really completely applied. Even if the future German army, with its short period of service, is 300,000 men strong, and even if it obtains the necessary defensive weapons simultaneously with the transformation of the Reichswehr into the new type of army, France and the other highly armed States will maintain a very great advantage in the realm of armaments. In these circumstances, the refusal of the German demands could only mean a refusal truly to recognize Germany's equality of rights. The German Government therefore hope that, if the French Government again take into consideration all the factors influencing the problem, they will not definitely exclude the German point of view, and that they will thus find the way to the agreement which is so urgently desired by Germany.

The German Government naturally share the opinion that the disarmament problem cannot be solved by negotiation between Germany and France alone, and that negotiations with all States concerned are necessary. These general negotiations will, however, be considerably facilitated by an agreement between Germany and France on the principal questions, for such an agreement constitutes one of the most important conditions for the conclusion of the disarmament convention.

The proof of Germany's readiness for international co-operation and the spirit underlying that readiness can be seen in her offer to conclude pacts of non-aggression. The external form in which such co-operation can best be realised in future is, in the view of the German Government, a question which should be reserved for future consideration. The pressing need of the moment is the settlement of the disarmament question, a successful issue to which would clear the way for the solution of the other political problems which are standing open.

ANNEX

1. To what maximum strengths will the total French effectives at home and overseas be reduced?
2. In what manner will France's overseas troops and her trained reserves be reckoned under the settlement proposed in the French aide-mémoire?
3. Is France ready to undertake neither to station nor to make use of overseas troops in times of war and of peace in the metropolitan territory, if the transformation of the armies into defensive armies with short service is not made applicable to the overseas forces stationed both at home and overseas?
4. What will happen to the guns of the movable land artillery which exceed a calibre of 15 cm.? Will they be destroyed? Will the continued training in the use of these guns be permitted?
5. What maximum tonnage will be proposed for tanks, and what will happen to the tanks which exceed this maximum?
6. Does the French Government contemplate a limitation by numbers of separate categories of weapons for all countries, a limitation which would include stocks? What are these categories of weapons?
7. With what material will those French troops be equipped which are not subjected to the standardisation of armies?

8. Within what period would the 50 per cent reduction of the aircraft in service be carried through? Will the elimination of the aircraft which are to be done away with be accomplished by destruction or in what other way?

9. To what will the control of civil aviation and of aircraft production apply, which, according to the French proposal, is to be the pre-condition for the reduction of the military aircraft in active service?

10. Will a definite term be fixed in the convention for the general abolition of military aviation, and, if so, what term?

11. Shall the prohibition of bombing, which the French Government is ready to accept, be general and absolute or to what practical limitations shall it be subjected?

12. Are the remarks in the aide-mémoire regarding the control of war material to be understood to mean that France is only ready to accept for herself the control of manufacture and of importation, or will this control extend to stocks of material which are in service and in store?

13. What is the position of the French Government as regards naval armaments?

ANNEX VII

MEMORANDUM OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Published in Rome on January 31, 1934)

(Translation)

In the conversations which took place in Rome on the 3rd and 4th January between the Head of the Government and the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Head of the Government communicated to Sir John Simon the Italian point of view regarding the disarmament situation and the prospects of disarmament on the lines of the following document:—

1. The Italian Government are convinced that an examination of the problem of "disarmament" with reference to the position of Germany as well as to the general situation, cannot but show that we have well-nigh reached the extreme limit of time available for overcoming the deadlock in which we have found ourselves since June last.

The Italian Government think it unnecessary to dwell on this premise. It will be enough to mention the existence of clear and numerous indications which go to prove that if the solution be further delayed rearmament, instead of a debated question, will become a question which may or might be practically solved in a unilateral manner. The gravity of such a fact is self-evident, in view of the increased difficulties which it would create for a peaceful international and juridical solution of the problem of equality, for a European *détente* and for the possibilities of reaching a reasonable convention of effective disarmament in a not too distant future. It is on the other hand certain that the results will be a renewed spirit of mutual suspicion, the division of Europe into hostile groups and a race in armaments.

From this premise the Italian Government deduce that each Government must now assume their own responsibilities, decide to adopt a definite attitude and be prepared to make it known publicly.

2. The experience of the discussions that have taken place during the past two years at the Disarmament Conference, the course of the diplomatic negotiations, and the public declarations made by responsible statesmen, have brought

the Italian Government to harbour well-grounded doubts whether the armed Powers desire or are able to agree on such measures of disarmament as would permit a solution of the present situation limiting the demands of Germany within the modest dimensions envisaged at a previous stage.

It is further necessary to bear in mind that Germany by excluding from her demands for equality the heavier types of war materials, and confining her claim to the so-called defensive weapons—that is to say the weapons that even on the most optimistic hypothesis would be retained by the armed Powers at least for the duration of a first period, or for that of a first convention—has been able in a measure to dissociate the problem of equality of rights from that of effective disarmament. Such disarmament is therefore now presented as the task of the armed Powers exclusively, Germany having long ago completely done her part.

It follows that the undertaking to bring pressure upon her to make her recede from or moderate her claims for defensive material, becomes all the more difficult, even if the armed Powers were willing to consent to an important and immediate reduction of their offensive armaments; for the German position consists in denying the correlation between the two kinds of armaments, the first representing equality of rights and the second disarmament, which does not bind her as she is not armed.

The Italian Government desire, however, to state that their policy has been, is and intends to remain, a policy of disarmament; and only recently by their unconditional acceptance of the British plan of the 16th March, 1933, they afforded the most convincing proof of this. They continue therefore to consider a solution in this sense as the most desirable. If, therefore, within a reasonable time, the negotiations which are being pursued should afford justifiable grounds for hoping that the armed Powers have unanimously resolved to undertake substantial measures of disarmament, Italy, in accordance with her own interests, would not only adhere to this decision, but would not fail to join, with the utmost goodwill, in the attempt to turn it to immediate advantage in order to obtain from Germany greater limitations to her rearmament than, in the contrary event, it seems possible to secure by agreements.

The Italian Government desire, however, to declare in all frankness that only clear intentions, clearly defined without delay, not subordinated to clauses or conditions that are already *a priori* unacceptable to other powers, and of such a scope as to create a technically, juridically and morally sound position for the negotiators, would offer any hope of success. In the contrary event, we shall only have a renewal of academic declarations and counter-declarations, of discussions and of recriminations which will not and cannot do anything to avoid the regrettable events to which allusion has been made.

3. Leaving such a possibility still open, therefore, but turning, as indeed the urgency of the moment requires, to the situation as it appears at present, the Italian Government appeal to three principal criteria: that is to say, to a condition of fact, to a juridical point and to an estimate of probabilities, that in their aggregate seem to them to restrict the field of possible solutions and combinations within limits as clear as they are compact and, having regard to the circumstances, satisfactory.

(a) *Condition of Fact.*—The danger that, if no agreement is reached, the question of equality may, in fact, be solved independently of agreements tending to sanction it and to regulate the method of its achievement. This consideration naturally carries with it an examination of the possibilities and the scope of the sanctions, and of the willingness to apply them, designed to hinder or suppress movements which do not take the treaties into account; but the mere consideration of such an eventuality affords a measure of the gravity of the situation

which would arise in the event of no agreement being reached, and emphasis, if indeed that were necessary, the necessity of arriving at such an agreement in a prompt and satisfactory manner.

(b) *Juridical Point.*—It is undeniable that equality of rights has been solemnly recognized to Germany and to the other States disarmed by the Treaties of Peace. The impossibility in which the armed Powers, signatories of the said treaties, find themselves of immediately reducing their armaments to a level reasonably approaching the level of German disarmament gives to the German claim for rearmament a juridical and moral force, of which it is not easy to deny the evident truth. And if it is possible to demonstrate, as will be shown below, that the condition of security is also found to have been reasonably met, the argument in favour of Germany assumes a content not easy to refute.

(c) *Estimate of Probabilities.*—The Italian Government cannot but give the utmost weight to the pacific declarations of President Hindenburg and Chancellor Hitler. Apart from the fact that it is not possible to base agreements on suspicion, one must admit that the repeated and uniform declarations of the Head of the German Government afford confidence that well-defined agreements, freely accepted, would not only not be lightly broken, but would not, for the whole term of their duration, be compromised in the diplomatic field by demands for further concessions and modifications.

And inasmuch as scrutiny of what may be in the interests and within the power of a contracting party undoubtedly invests the sincerity of its pledges with a greater certainty, the Italian Government express their considered opinion that the Germany of Hitler is at present taken up with a work of far-reaching transformation and internal readjustment with which it would be difficult to reconcile designs for warlike enterprises beyond the frontiers. It is understood in this connection that the Italian Government are naturally aware of other and more material aspects of the problem of security; but these will be referred to later.

4. Admitting what has been said above, the Italian Government are of opinion that it is still possible to conclude a convention such as to satisfy—perhaps partially, but none the less positively—public opinion, especially if the latter was suitably enlightened. In considering this point it should be remarked that we have clear indications that even in neutral countries directly interested, public opinion is adapting itself to the idea that the principal and practical question is no longer how to prevent German rearmament, but how to avoid that such rearmament should take place unregulated and uncontrolled.

5. With regard, more especially, to the convention which the Italian Government think might be attained, and which might remain in force up to the 31st December, 1940, it should, in particular, provide for—

- (1) The abolition of chemical warfare, with every necessary measure of supervision to prevent preparation and training.
- (2) Prohibition of the bombardment of civil populations, bearing in mind that in the field of prohibition of bombardment from the air more radical measures will be possible where the rule of the interdependence of land, sea and air armaments permits; it should be noted that such a measure ought greatly to facilitate the solution of the problem of equality of rights with regard to German air armaments.
- (3) Limitation to the present level of military expenditure by the Powers not bound by the Treaties of Peace, with a proviso for expenditure on replacements and completion of defensive works.
- (4) Limitation to the present level of land war material of the Powers not bound by the said treaties, but provision for the replacement of material.

6. *Effectives*.—It should be borne in mind that the German claim for an average daily effective of 300,000 men is governed by the hypothesis that the other armed Powers do not reduce their effectives to the figures put forward in the MacDonald plan, but keep to their present figures. If it were found preferable to face the problem of reduction, Germany declares herself ready to rediscuss the figures given above.

This being so, the Italian Government, considering the present level of effectives of, for instance, France, Poland and Czechoslovakia, doubt whether it can plausibly be argued that the ratios resulting from the MacDonald plan have been altered in favour of Germany in the German proposals.

As to the particular problem of the reduction and standardization of effectives, the Italian Government wish to point out that it would entail so many delicate problems between other contracting Powers, that facing it might cause damaging delays in the conclusion of the agreement. Further, they are bound to admit that, at least as particularly concerns them, the abandonment of the present organization of land effectives in the sense of the MacDonald plan would certainly entail a heavy burden of expenditure not compensated by corresponding economies with regard to war material.

They are therefore prepared to negotiate on the basis of the *status quo* and of limitation as envisaged by the German proposals. As to the stages in which the transformation of the German forces and their increase would take place, the Italian Government are of opinion that technical requirements impose such stages upon Germany, and that therefore an opportunity is offered to make them the subject of contractual obligations. It is to be noted that the work of transformation could not take place without the conspicuous incapacity for action not only offensive but also defensive that usually accompanies such periods of radical change in military organization.

Whilst it seems difficult to reject in principle the German claim for defensive armaments—guns up to 155 mm. or the equivalent, anti-aircraft guns, tanks up to 6 tons, scouting and fighting planes—if we hope to see them realized under a régime of convention and supervision, the limits and the measure of the ratio between the defensive war materials and the effectives to be granted might form the object of negotiations.

7. In regard to naval armaments, apart from the examination of precise explanations which Germany might give in this field, eventual revision of the conditions applying to German naval armaments ought in principle to be postponed until the next naval conference.

8. To the concessions which an agreement on those lines would entail France would find an immediate and effective counterpart in the maintenance intact of her armaments. There seems to be no doubt that, from the technical military point of view, this would suffice to guarantee her an undoubted security for the whole duration of the convention, so that this problem from the material point of view might be said to be favourably solved. This argument acquires still greater validity if the efficacy of modern systems of permanent defence of the frontiers is taken into consideration, as well as the assistance ensured by existing treaties.

9. As to security based on treaties, it is unnecessary for the Italian Government to refer to the Pact of Rome, the Pact of Locarno and the significance and value of the undertakings contained therein. It is not so much the formal and treaty aspect of security which gives weight to the Four-Power Pact, as the continual and methodical collaboration between the great Western Powers which its clauses contemplate, and this both in the field of disarmament and in other fields.

Italy considers herself loyally bound by the Locarno Pact, which assigns a special position to the Italian and British Governments, and precisely on account of her unwavering loyalty considers that she cannot diverge from the view of the London Government in holding that further diplomatic guarantees against aggressions are not only not indispensable, but, if multiplied, would tend to lose their value.

The German Government have, further, recently offered the conclusion of ten-year non-aggression pacts to all neighbouring States.

10. A final and fundamental counterpart to the acceptance of Germany's demands—representing in itself a new contribution to security—might be an undertaking on the part of Germany to return to Geneva, not only with a view to signing the general Disarmament Convention there, but to resume her place in the League of Nations. The Italian Government are particularly anxious to call attention to the first-rate importance of such an event.

11. Finally, the Italian Government cannot lay too much stress upon the necessity that the exchanges of view which are at present taking place should at last lead to sufficient progress to enable the entire question to emerge from the present deadlock, thus justifying a meeting of the Foreign Ministers or of the Heads of the Governments of the four Western Powers, a meeting to which the representatives of the other principal Powers concerned might be invited.

ANNEX VIII

UNITED KINGDOM MEMORANDUM ON DISARMAMENT

(Laid before Parliament on January 31, 1934.)

I.

1. On the 22nd November the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference unanimously decided that the work of the conference should be suspended for a period in order to permit of parallel and supplementary efforts being carried on between different States, mainly through the diplomatic channel. In the interval this method has been actively pursued, and bilateral communications have taken place between various capitals. As a result, the points of view of certain Governments have been further defined, and some general propositions which they had previously advanced have taken a more concrete shape. Yet it must be admitted that, on comparing the attitudes thus disclosed, no firm basis of agreement at present emerges; and, while these diplomatic exchanges have undoubtedly cleared the ground and revealed the immensity and difficulty of the problem in their true proportions, the method recently followed cannot in itself produce a unanimous result and is in danger of exhausting its usefulness. On the other hand, a resumption of the discussions at Geneva without any new directive suggestions is only too likely to lead to further disappointment.

2. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider that the time has arrived when they should make plain their own attitude in the present situation, the gravity of which must be apparent to every thoughtful mind, and should thus make a further positive contribution, so far as lies in their power, to promote a reconciliation of views in a matter upon which the future of the world may depend. If agreement is to be reached and a Convention is to be signed, it is useless for any Power merely to insist on its own ideals and its own requirements or to refuse to depart in

any degree from the solution which it deems best. His Majesty's Government are making the present communication, not for the purpose of formulating unattainable ideals, but in order to indicate the lines of a compromise which they believe, after reviewing the history of the discussions and closely studying the recent interchange of views, should be generally acceptable.

3. Before dealing with any specific proposition as to the measure or the regulation of armaments, His Majesty's Government must reassert the main objective to which all proposals on this subject are directed. That objective is, as article 8 of the Covenant declares, the maintenance of peace. Even though increase of armed strength may be actuated by reasons of defence, it is an index of fear of attack from another quarter, and a measure of the alarm and disquiet existing between peoples. Conversely, a general agreement securing the limitation of armaments at the lowest practicable level would be the most effective and significant proof of international appeasement and an encouragement of the mutual confidence which springs from good and neighbourly relations. Consequently, His Majesty's Government regard agreement about armaments not as an end in itself, but rather as a concomitant of world peace and as an outcome of political amelioration. For this reason, they have always acknowledged the relation between the conception of equality of rights on the one hand, and of security on the other. For this same reason, they welcome the indications that Herr Hitler's recent proposals, whatever may be said of their precise content, are concerned not only with technical questions of armament, but with political guarantees against aggression.

4. It follows from the above considerations that agreement is most likely to be reached on a broad basis which combines regulation of armaments with assurances in the political field. Protracted debates on disarmament in its limited and purely technical aspect can lead to no conclusion, unless wider considerations touching the equality and the security of nations are borne in mind and provided for. Hence the United Kingdom Draft Convention, which was approved at Geneva as a basis of the ultimate agreement by a unanimous vote which included both France and Germany, began with a "Part I" on the subject of Security, proposing methods of consultation for the purpose of determining on appropriate action in the event of a threatened breach of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The amplification of this proposal is dealt with below (paragraph 9). His Majesty's Government must emphasize that they have never departed from the principles and purposes of the Draft Convention or have sought to substitute a second and contradictory draft for it. If there were any misapprehension in any quarter on this score, the declaration they are now making will finally remove it. The Prime Minister, when presenting the Draft Convention to the Conference in March of last year, plainly intimated that it was not necessarily to be regarded as a final and unalterable text, and subsequent discussion has shown that it requires adjustment in certain respects if general agreement is to be reached. Any suggestions which have since been put forward for consideration have been tentatively advanced with a view to seeing whether they would promote such agreement, and for no other purpose. But the underlying conceptions of the Draft Convention remain the standpoint of His Majesty's Government, and could only be abandoned if and when a more acceptable alternative were generally agreed.

5. But while His Majesty's Government are not prepared to depart from the lines of the Draft Convention without being assured that there is an alternative which would more readily lead to universal agreement, they have been perfectly prepared to give unprejudiced consideration to new suggestions and to do their utmost to promote their general acceptance. The failure to reach agreement would inflict a fearful blow upon the hopes of all friends of peace throughout the world, whereas the attainment of agreement would create

and build up that confidence which is the only secure basis for the limitation of armaments. The importance, therefore, of attaining international agreement by any possible means is so great that no suggestions, from whatever quarter they come, should be rejected merely because of a preference for a better solution which is, in fact, unattainable. An illustration lies ready to hand. It is sometimes urged that the solution of the disarmament problem lies in the immediate abandonment by all the world of all the weapons which the Peace Treaties withheld from certain Powers. But it is manifest that such a solution is in practice unattainable at the present time. That is no reason for abandoning the effort to secure, in this first Convention, all that can be attained. The devotion of the whole British people to the cause of disarmament is deep and sincere, as is sufficiently proved by the present position of its armaments in comparison with those of other leading Powers. They realize that further progress can only be achieved by agreement, and therefore His Majesty's Government would still work for agreement, even though, having regard to the principle of equality of rights, agreement is found to involve alongside of disarmament in some quarters some measure of rearmament in others.

6. It should not be overlooked that the scheme of the Draft Convention itself involves some degree of rearmament for those States whose armaments are at present restricted by treaty. Germany, for example, in view of the numerical increase proposed in her effectives, would need larger quantities of such weapons as she is already entitled to possess. And this is not all. His Majesty's Government have more than once publicly stated that an international agreement based on the admitted principle of equality of rights in a régime of security necessarily involves that, within the stages provided for by such an agreement, the situation must be reached in which arms of a kind permitted to one State cannot continue to be denied to another. His Majesty's Government see no escape from this conclusion, and they do not seek to escape from it, for they are convinced that the best prospect for the future peace of the world would be afforded by an agreement which recognizes and provides for this parity of treatment, while it abolishes or reduces to the lowest possible level all arms of a specially offensive character, and provides by the most appropriate means available for a greater sense of security. So far as Europe is concerned, a reconciliation of the points of view of France and Germany is the essential condition of general agreement. If a way is not found to accommodate their respective points of view, this greater sense of security will not be promoted. And without it, substantial disarmament is impossible. On the other hand, if an agreement is reached, even if the agreement at present attainable falls short of the highest hopes, the gain of reaching and observing such an agreement would be immeasurable, and the fact that it had been reached and observed would form the firm foundation on which a further agreement of more comprehensive character might be based in the future.

7. We must therefore seek a solution where a solution can be found. No agreement is no solution at all, and the world will be thrown back upon unrestricted competition in the supply and manufacture of weapons of destruction, the end of which no man can see. Putting aside, therefore, as not immediately attainable the ideal of universal disarmament to Germany's permitted level, and refusing to acquiesce in the conclusion that agreement cannot be reached, the choice appears to His Majesty's Government to lie between two conceivable courses so far as the future armaments of the heavily armed Powers are concerned. These two choices are:—

- (1) To reach agreement in a Convention which will involve the abandonment of certain classes of weapons by the most heavily armed Powers.
- (2) To reach agreement on the basis that the most heavily armed Powers are unable or unwilling to disarm, but that they will undertake not to increase their present armaments.

The second course is the one which is indicated in certain quarters as the most that can be helped for. But His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate as acceptable a conclusion which, though it would provide for a limitation of armaments, would do nothing whatever to secure their reduction. His Majesty's Government, therefore, would earnestly press upon other Governments that the first course, which they most strongly prefer and regard as more in accord with the main object to be attained, should not be abandoned, but should be actively pursued. The second part of this Memorandum sets out the way in which His Majesty's Government believe this could be accomplished.

II

8. His Majesty's Government conceive that international agreement in the matter of armaments can only be reached by making adequate provision under the three heads of (a) security, (b) equality of rights, (c) disarmament. These three topics were all dealt with in the Draft Convention, and the object of the present document is to explain how, in the light of actual circumstances and of the claims and proposals put forward from various quarters, the contents of that Draft Convention might be modified or expanded in certain particulars with a view to securing general agreement. His Majesty's Government have studied with close attention the points of view advanced by the French, Italian, German, and other Governments in the course of recent interchanges. Nearly a year ago His Majesty's Government undertook the responsibility of placing before the General Commission a full Draft Convention. The adjustments now proposed in the text of that Draft are such as subsequent communication and consideration show to be best calculated to bring about concrete results.

9. *Security*.—Part I of the Draft Convention dealt with the subject of security. As the result of a redraft which was unanimously approved on the 24th May, 1933, it now consists of four articles, three of which provide in effect that, in the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris, immediate consultation may be called for and shall take place between signatories to the Convention for the purpose of preserving the peace, of using good offices for the restoration of peace, and, in the event that it proves impossible thus to restore the peace, to determine which party or parties to the dispute should be held responsible. It will be observed therefore that, as at present drafted, the event which brings these provisions into play is the breach or threatened breach of the Pact of Paris. His Majesty's Government regard such provisions as of very great importance. But so vital is the connection of a feeling of security with the peace of the world that they would add to them yet further articles. It is in their view important to extend the principle of consultation in the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris to the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Disarmament Convention itself. They would therefore suggest that three new articles—2 (a), 2 (b) and 2 (c)—should be inserted between the revised articles 2 and 3. The first of these—2 (a)—would be article 89 of the present Draft Convention, which declares that the loyal execution of the Convention is a matter of common interest to the High Contracting Parties. Article 2 (b) would declare: "The provisions for immediate consultation contained in article 1 will also be applicable in the event of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, to be set up in accordance with Part V, Section 1, of the present Convention, reporting the existence of facts which show that any High Contracting Party has failed to execute loyally the present Convention." Article 2 (c) would state: "It shall be the object of such consultation to exchange views as to the steps to be taken for the purpose of restoring the situation and of maintaining in operation the provisions of the present Convention." The insertion of these articles would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government,

emphasise the inescapable duty of all signatories of the Convention to keep in the closest touch with one another, and to do whatever is right and possible to prevent or remedy any violation of so important an international treaty.

A further contribution to the cause of peace and security, by lessening any tension or anxiety which exists between Germany and surrounding States, is provided by the willingness of the German Chancellor to conclude pacts of non-aggression with all Germany's neighbours. Such pacts should in no way weaken, but, on the contrary, should expressly reaffirm existing obligations to maintain peace under such instruments as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris and the Treaties of Locarno, and His Majesty's Government cannot doubt that if such pacts were expressly entered into in connection with the Convention (which, like the pacts themselves, His Majesty's Government, for reasons stated below, consider might be made in the first instance for a period of ten years) their practical value for the purpose of creating a sense of security will not be disputed.

His Majesty's Government consider that the suggestions here collected under the head of security constitute a sum total worthy of general acceptance. They have a right to expect that, if these provisions and pledges were solemnly entered into, they would not be lightly violated, and that any violation of them would be met in the most practical and effective way by immediately assembling Governments and States in support of international peace and agreement against the disturber and the violator.

10. *Equality of Rights.*—The Five-Power Declaration of the 11th December, 1932, put on record, in connection with the problem of disarmament, the principle "of equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations" and declared that this principle should find itself embodied in a Disarmament Convention effecting a substantial reduction and limitation of armaments. From this Declaration His Majesty's Government have never withdrawn and they now reaffirm their unqualified adherence to it. The previous paragraph of this Memorandum attempts to define the essential elements of security without which the necessary conditions for an adequate Disarmament Convention would not be fulfilled. But His Majesty's Government do not hesitate to declare that the principle of equality of rights is no less essential in the matter of armaments than the principle of security—both must have their practical application if international agreement about armaments is to be reached. The proposals which follow, no less than the Draft Convention itself, are conceived in that spirit, and constitute a practical fulfilment of that principle.

11. *Disarmament.*—His Majesty's Government are glad to understand that Chancellor Hitler has declared that Germany voluntarily renounces any claim to possess "offensive" weapons and limits herself to normal "defensive" armaments required for the army with which she would be provided in the Convention. The German Chancellor, moreover, advances this proposition on the assumption that the heavily armed States are not prepared to abandon under the Convention any portion of their existing weapons. As already indicated in paragraph 7 of this Memorandum, His Majesty's Government are entirely unwilling to accept this last assumption, and must insist that the only agreement worthy of the name of a Disarmament Convention will be one which contains reduction as well as limitation of armaments. There is, moreover, a further reason why His Majesty's Government emphasise the fact that the German Chancellor's declaration renouncing offensive armaments and claiming only what is necessary for normal defence, is based upon the assumption that the heavily armed Powers are not prepared to reduce their own armaments in any degree. The measure of Germany's need will necessarily be reduced if this assumption proves incorrect. A positive contribution to disarmament by the heavily armed Powers will there-

fore help to bring the scale down all round, and should, as His Majesty's Government conceive, reduce the demands which Germany might otherwise be disposed to put forward.

12. The following proposals, in modification of the Draft Convention, are put forward on the assumption that the agreement would last for ten years. They have been framed after giving the fullest and most anxious consideration to suggestions and criticisms from all other quarters, and represent, in the judgment of His Majesty's Government, what might well be agreed in existing circumstances.

13. (a) *Effectives*.—While His Majesty's Government are still in favour so far as they are concerned, of the figures given in the table they submitted at the end of article 13 of the Draft Convention, they are aware of the recent discussion with the German Government in regard to the proper number of average daily effectives which should be allotted to Germany. To the figure of 200,000 on a basis of 8 months' service proposed in the Draft Convention, the German Government have suggested the alternative of 300,000 on a basis of 12 months' service. This is one of the outstanding points of difference emerging from the recent exchange of views through the diplomatic channel. Though the point is difficult and serious, His Majesty's Government do not think this divergence ought to raise any insuperable obstacle to an agreed compromise. In the Draft Convention they themselves proposed 200,000 as the figure for the average daily effectives stationed in the home country for France, Germany, Italy, and Poland. It is not the figure of 200,000 which in their mind is the essential and unalterable element, but the principle of parity, fairly calculated and applied, in these effectives between the four countries. They are aware that difficult calculations are necessary to establish the right figures for the ten years which, as above suggested, would be the life of the Disarmament Convention, but His Majesty's Government are convinced that the fixing of the proper figure cannot be beyond the power of adjustment between the States principally concerned if the problem was made the subject of frank and conciliatory discussion between them. If the figure of 200,000 was found to be too low, an accommodation could surely be found between this figure (which His Majesty's Government believe to be preferred by the majority of the Powers concerned) and 300,000.

Agreement as to this figure will enable all European continental armies to be reduced to a standard type composed of short-term effectives as proposed in the Draft Convention. His Majesty's Government suggest that this process should be completed in, at most, four years. In article 16 of the Draft Convention, eight months was suggested as the maximum total period of service for these effectives, though, at the same time, it was recognized that in special cases the period might have to be twelve months. His Majesty's Government appreciate that this must necessarily be a matter for the continental Governments to determine, and they are ready to concur in the longer period if such is the general desire.

In regard to land armed forces stationed overseas, His Majesty's Government have no further reductions to propose in addition to those already inserted in the Draft Convention. These, it will be remembered, would entail a considerable reduction of French overseas forces.

A difficult problem has been raised in regard to the so-called "para-military training," i.e., the military training outside the army of men of military age. His Majesty's Government suggest that such training outside the army should be prohibited, this prohibition being checked by a system of permanent and automatic supervision, in which the supervising organisation should be guided less by a strict definition of the term "military training" than by the military knowledge and experience of its experts. They are particularly glad to be informed that the German Government have freely promised to provide proof,

through the medium of control, that the S.A. and the S.S. are not of a military character, and have added that similar proof will be furnished in respect of the Labour Corps. It is essential to a settlement that any doubts and suspicions in regard to these matters should be set and kept at rest.

14. (b) *Land War Material*.—Certain countries will require, for the increased numbers of their standardized armies, an increased number of such weapons as are at present possessed by their smaller long-service armies. His Majesty's Government accept this view. They would emphasize that, under the Convention, prohibition as to the possession of anti-aircraft guns would disappear. They would suggest that the maximum calibre of guns in permanent frontier and fortress defensive systems should be fixed by international agreement.

Of the types of land war material at present denied by treaty to certain Powers, His Majesty's Government consider two weapons in particular must be dealt with. His Majesty's Government proposed in their Draft Convention that the maximum limit for the weight of tanks should be 16 tons. They recognised, however, that this problem "evidently requires further international examination." They are most anxious, in the interests alike of disarmament and of the realisation of the equality of all countries, that progress should at once be made with the elimination of tanks above the 16-ton limit. They suggest, therefore, that tanks over 30 tons should be destroyed by the end of the first year, over 20 tons by the end of the third year and over 16 tons by the end of the fifth year. These practical steps should help towards the solution of the problem, but "further international examination," as contemplated by Article 21 of the Draft Convention, is obviously necessary. His Majesty's Government propose that this examination should be held by the Permanent Disarmament Commission, and should be completed not later than by the end of the third year. His Majesty's Government understand that the German Government maintain that tanks up to 6 tons are, in their view, necessary for the defence of their country. This view of the German Government was based on the supposition that other countries would make no reduction in respect of tanks at all, whereas His Majesty's Government now propose the reductions set forth above. None the less, His Majesty's Government are, for their part, willing to agree that the new German short-term service army, contemplated by the Draft Convention, should be equipped with tanks up to 6 tons. His Majesty's Government would be willing to agree to a similar arrangement in respect of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

As regards mobile land guns, it will be recalled that in the Draft Convention His Majesty's Government made the proposal to secure that the maximum limit of these guns for the future should be 115 mm. They would greatly regret any proposals which tend to increase the size of future construction beyond this calibre, but they are bound to face the fact that the German Government maintain the view that mobile land guns up to 155 mm. are necessary as part of the armament of the proposed new short-term service army. His Majesty's Government, though still preferring the more drastic proposals of their Draft Convention, are willing to acquiesce in this proposal as part of the Convention, if by so doing they can secure prompt and general agreement on all points. His Majesty's Government would be willing to agree to similar proposals in respect of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

But there remains the question whether it is not possible, by means of the proposed Convention, to secure the reduction in the maximum calibre of mobile land guns possessed by any Power. His Majesty's Government propose that such guns over 350 mm. should be destroyed by the end of the first year, those over 220 mm. by the end of the fourth year and those over 155 mm. by the end of the seventh year.

15. (c) *Air Armaments*.—His Majesty's Government have repeatedly emphasised the great importance of agreement in regard to the limitation and reduction of air armaments which may, in the future, prove the most potent military weapons in the possession of mankind. Full reflection has convinced them of the justice of the proposals contained in articles 34-41 of their Draft Convention. Article 35 requires that the Permanent Disarmament Commission shall, immediately, devote itself to the working out of the best possible schemes providing for the complete abolition of military and naval aircraft, which must be dependent on the effective supervision of civil aviation to prevent its misuse for military purposes. His Majesty's Government are aware that the German Delegation at Geneva moved an amendment to this article, proposing the total abolition of military and naval aircraft without, however, making any specific provision for solving the problem of civil aviation. The appropriate occasion to discuss this proposal would be the immediate enquiry provided for in article 35. In their view it would be prejudicial to the prospects of the enquiry that any party not hitherto entitled to possess military aircraft should claim such possession pending the results of the enquiry. At the same time they frankly recognise that Germany and other States not at present entitled to military aircraft could not be asked to postpone for long their claim. They suggest, therefore, that the maintenance of the *status quo* laid down in article 36 of their Draft Convention should be modified as follows: If the Permanent Disarmament Commission has not decided on abolition at the end of two years, all countries shall be entitled to possess military aircraft. Countries would reduce or increase by stages, as the case might be, in the following eight years so as to attain, by the end of the Convention, the figures in the table annexed to article 41, or some other figures to be agreed on. Germany would acquire parity with the principal air Powers by these stages, and corresponding provisions would be made for other Powers not at present entitled to possess military or naval aircraft.

16. It is, of course, understood that all construction or fresh acquisition of weapons of the kinds which are to be destroyed during the life of the Convention would be prohibited.

17. (d) *Naval Armaments*.—His Majesty's Government, for their part, still stand by the Naval Chapter of the Draft Convention. They appreciate, however, that the time which has passed since they put forward that Draft Convention last March has brought much closer the assembling of the Naval Conference of 1935. Should it be thought, in view of this consideration, that the situation prior to the 1935 Conference could appropriately be dealt with by some simpler arrangement than that contained in the Naval Chapter, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to make proposals to that end in due course. They suggest, however, that prompt agreement on other matters, and embodiment of that agreement in a world-wide convention, would be of great assistance to the naval discussions proposed in article 33 of the Draft Convention.

18. *Supervision*.—His Majesty's Government are well aware of the great importance attached by various Governments to the institution of a system of permanent and automatic supervision to control the observance of the Disarmament Convention. There is obviously a close connection between mutual agreement about levels of armament and a system of adequate international supervision. There are, however, many technical difficulties which arise in this connection and which must be practically met. His Majesty's Government affirm their willingness, if general agreement is reached on all other issues, to agree to the application of a system of permanent and automatic supervision, to come into force with the obligations of the Convention.

19. It will be seen that the adjustments which His Majesty's Government propose are based on a duration of ten years for the Convention. The Draft Convention suggested five years. Continued reflection, however, on the subject

and constant discussion with other Governments have convinced His Majesty's Government that any stable system should be founded on a longer period. Only if a longer view is taken can substantial reductions of armaments, and the full realisation of all countries' equality of rights and durable security, be realised. The proposal of the German Chancellor, that undertakings not to resort to force between Germany and other European Powers should be of at least ten years' duration, fits in very closely with the proposal now made by His Majesty's Government that the Disarmament Convention itself should be of ten years' duration. They confidently hope that, if a Convention on the lines now proposed can be accepted, humanity will within the coming ten years acquire such a deep-rooted conviction of the contribution to peace which such a Convention can make that, when the Convention is due to expire, further progress can be achieved in the reduction of armaments. By the successful conclusion of a Convention on such lines, and in the atmosphere of firmer peace and increased mutual confidence which would accompany it, the way will be prepared for a closer and more hopeful approach to the political and economic problems which at present perplex and divide the nations of the world.

20. The object of His Majesty's Government in formulating these proposals and presenting them for consideration is not to describe the terms of an agreement which they themselves would most desire, without regard to the claims or needs of others, but to propound a basis of compromise on which it would appear, in present circumstances, that general agreement could and should now be reached. The proposals, therefore, must be considered as a whole and they are framed in the endeavour fairly to meet essential claims on all sides. The grave consequences which would follow the failure of the Disarmament Conference are realised by all and need no further emphasis. The policy of His Majesty's Government in the international sphere is directed, first and foremost, to contributing to the utmost of their power to the avoidance of these consequences by promoting general agreement. If agreement is secured and the return of Germany to Geneva and to the League of Nations brought about (and this ought to be an essential condition of agreement), the signature of the Convention would open a new prospect of international co-operation and lay a new foundation for international order.

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